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#### We, the flesh of the United States federal government, are capable of reasserting the excessive enjoyment of life through sacrifice.  We, the flesh of the United States federal government, should hold a binding national policy referendum over whether to gloriously sacrifice our flesh to live like suns and implement the result.

#### ---Genuine citizen engagement in energy policy formation is critical engage the body politic with it’s own beurocratic excess.

Hendriks 2009

Carolyn M., Crawford School of Economics and Government @ Australia National University, Securing public legitimacy for long-term energy reforms, PUBLIC POLICY NETWORK CONFERENCETHE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, CANBERRA29-30 JANUARY

Integrate policy development with empowered forms of citizen engagement A more radical strategy would be to extend energy debates into the public realm by facilitating inclusive forms of citizen engagement on energy reform. The idea here is to not only explore citizens’ ideas and feedback, but also their considered preferences of various scenarios or policy options. In many respects this proposal builds on the social mapping component of CSIRO’s EFF project described above. Here the recommendation is to ensure that public views are not merely informing research, but that they are fed into, and affect policy discussions and decisions. Another inspiring project in this respect is a recent Belgian project in which energy futures were co-produced with citizens and stakeholders.15 This strategy will only be successful if citizen input can penetrate through the highly elite and technical nature of existing energy discussions. For this to happen, actors in the energy community may have to reconsider their views on the role of citizens in energy politics.

#### ---Engagement with the people is a prerequisite to larger expressions of uselessness.

Löwy 2009

Michael, Fellow of the IIRE in Amsterdam and former research director of the French National Council for Scientific Research, Climate Change - a contribution to the debate, IV Online magazine : IV418, http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1741

Ecosocialist planning must be based on democratic and pluralist debate, at every level of decision. Organized in the form of parties, platforms or any other kind of political movement, the delegates of the planning organizations would be elected and the various proposals would be presented to all those whom they concern. In other words, representative democracy must be enriched - and improved - by the direct democracy which makes it possible for people to directly choose - at the local, national and, finally, international level - between various proposals. The whole population would then discuss questions such as free public transport, a special tax paid by car owners to subsidize public transport, the subsidizing of solar energy, the reduction of working time to 30, 25 or even fewer hours a week, even if that involves a reduction of production. The democratic character of planning does not make it incompatible with the participation of experts whose role is not to decide, but to present their arguments - often different, even opposing - during the democratic process of decision-making. A question arises: what guarantee do we have that people will make the right choices, those which protect the environment, even if the price to be paid is to change some of their consumption habits? Such a “guarantee” does not exist, only the reasonable prospect that the rationality of democratic decisions will triumph once the fetishism of consumer goods has been abolished. It is certain that people will make mistakes by making bad choices, but don’t the experts themselves make mistakes? It is impossible to conceive of the construction of a new society without the majority of people attaining a high level of socialist and ecological consciousness as a result of their struggles, their self-education and their social experience.

#### ---The impact is American imperialism.

Cox 2012

William John, retired police officer, prosecutor, public interest lawyer, author and political activist, Global Research - Political Transformation in America: Effectuating Real Democracy by a Voters’ Rights Amendment, http://thevoters.org/

A National Policy Referendum can produce a number of positive results: First, the grassroots (and netroots) movement that compels the enactment of a referendum, whether by constitutional amendment or by congressional action will, in and of itself, transform the government. Once true representative democracy is effectuated, government will never again be the same. Second, the referendum process will result in a transformation of apathetic voters of every political persuasion into a more engaged, informed and motivated electorate. Once the power to create policy is realized by voters, they will naturally become more questioning and inquisitive. Moreover, voters will likely insist on civics classes in public schools to better prepare young people to evaluate and resist political propaganda and negative advertising in the future. Third, Congress will be compelled to identify actual problems, rather than the profit-motivated issues promoted by their corporate sponsors in the military-industrial complex and the health care, financial, and petroleum industries. In a representative democracy, it will necessarily be the responsibility of Congress to decide upon the most critical issues facing the nation during presidential elections; however, the Internet Age provides myriad opportunities for public participation in the process and for political parties to promote competing questions. Fourth, candidates for all elective offices, particularly presidential candidates, will be forced to take a public stand on a range of real problems. Undoubtedly, politicians will try to lie and dissemble about their positions on issues, but much like witnesses under cross-examination in a court case, they can be forced to simply answer yes or no to the most important questions. Finally, referendum voters will be much more inclined to study the issues, to confront their own prejudices and to challenge the positions of others before arriving at well-thought-out conclusions. Thoughtful answers to a policy referendum at the conclusion of an educational process are far more instructive and useful than quick answers offered during surprise opinion polls. Irrespective of their intelligence, level of education, or station in life, ordinary people are legally required to file income tax returns each year, as the government dips into their pockets to fund its operations and to pay the salaries of their representatives. If people are smart enough to pay taxes and brave enough to die in the wars started by their government, they also possess the ability to decide public policy. The collective wisdom of motivated and well-informed voters in a free society is a powerful force that will better protect its members against oppression by their own government and the people of other countries from the wars started for the financial benefit of corporate sponsors. The People’s Government The sanctity of elections in a representative democracy is directly dependent upon the strength of voter turnouts, which in turn depends on the trust of voters that their vote will make a difference, and by the integrity of the ballot box, which insures that all valid votes are properly counted. Voter Participation. In the United States, voter turnouts are historically much lower than in most other established democracies, and they have been steadily decreasing since peaking at 65% in 1960. The low point was reached in 1988 when barely half of the eligible voters appeared at the polls. Since then, the turnout has bounced up and down depending upon ballot issues, the closeness of the election and whether voters felt their lives would be affected or changed by the result. Even within the vagaries of turnouts, percentages are closely correlated with income, with 86% of people earning more than $75,000 voting, as compared to 52% of those with incomes of less than $15,000. Unsurprisingly, legislators are far more responsive to the issues that concern high-income voters. The best way to eliminate or minimize these disparities in participation is to hold elections on a national paid voting holiday to celebrate the federal elections held every two years and to honor the voters, who are the most important element of a democracy. A measure of the character of a person should not be which party, candidate or cause he or she supports, but whether or not the person actively participates in their government by casting a wise vote. Effective voting must become a sacrament in the nation’s political religion. Voter Suppression. Fair elections are best guaranteed by large turnouts; however, increasingly, there are political strategies that seek to subvert the process by actively suppressing voter turnout by those of opposing viewpoints. Rather than encouraging voters to support their position or candidate, campaigns engage in voter suppression efforts to discourage whole classes of people from exercising their right to vote. Suppression can operate indirectly through legislative processes, such as enacting unreasonable photo identification laws making it more difficult or expensive for low income, minority or elderly voters to register or to cast ballots, or by directly intimidating voters by threatening challenges at the polling place. Voter suppression can also take the form of mailings or telephone calls directing voters to the wrong polling place, by intentionally misleading voters about voting requirements, or by providing too few polling places in opposition precincts. Legislative restrictions on registration or voting must balance the benefits of an increased voter turnout with the risk of voting fraud, and all forms of intentional voter suppression should be prohibited. Computerized Voting. It might appear on the surface that computerized voting could supply a modern and secure method of voting; however, evidence of its vulnerabilities continues to accumulate. In addition to the facts that voting machines are manufactured and marketed by political partisans who refuse to disclose their operating codes, that the computers can be and have been easily hacked, and that voting machines are mechanically and electronically unreliable and often break down during elections, they do not produce an auditable paper ballot completed and verified by the voter. Paper Ballots. If American voters are to regain and retain control over their elections, they must refuse to use computerized voting machines or any other electronic ballot. Instead, voters must insist on hand-countable paper ballots upon which to record their choices. Even still, paper ballots can be optically scanned and quickly counted, but most importantly, each ballot is, indisputably, evidence of an individual’s vote and, collectively, paper ballots serve as a tangible symbol of democracy in action. Write-in Voting. Once in the voting booth, instead of responding like laboratory animals pushing a button in response to the stimulus of the latest ten-second television attack ad, voters should take time to carefully consider the issues and candidates presented on their ballots by the various political parties. Once a decision is reached, each voter should have the choice of demonstrating his or her literacy and inherent political power by voting on the most critical issues and by clearly writing in his or her personal choice for president of the United States, whether or not the name is printed on the ballot. So what if it takes a little longer to count, or recount, the ballots? Isn’t delayed gratification a small price to pay for ensuring that voters control elections, rather than those who profit from elections? If voter turnouts were to dramatically increase, and if only 15 to 25 percent of voters were to cast write-in votes, trust that the politicians would quickly register their willingness to accept every write-in vote naming them for any office of public trust and that they will be scrambling to ensure that all write-in votes cast for them are legally counted. The Future. Young Americans continue to be grievously wounded and killed in their nation’s wars to defend a “government of the people, by the people and for the people.” The question that must be answered now is what kind of government will these young people have in the future? Will it be a despotic government enabled by lazy and easily misled voters, who foolishly rely on robots to count their ballots? More likely, the People of the United States, of every political party, will prove once again they are smart enough to figure out they are being taken advantage of, and they will have the courage to do something about it. They just need to figure out what that “something” is. A Voters’ Rights Amendment Since its creation two hundred years ago, the People of the United States have traveled a long path toward achieving true representative democracy. Initially, only male property owners were allowed to cast ballots, but along the way the franchise has been extended, with a few exceptions, to all adult citizens. With its decision in Citizens United, the Supreme Court not only reversed two hundred years of progress toward a democracy for all of the people, it slammed the door shut and handed over the keys to corporations and other moneyed interests. Amending the Constitution. There has been a groundswell of bipartisan opposition to Citizens United, and a number of organizations representing tens of thousands of voters have proposed constitutional amendments to overcome the decision. Move to Amend is the best known and best organized of the opposition groups, and its proposed amendment aims to reverse the granting of corporate personhood and the equation of money and free speech ordered by the Court. Its proposal follows in the first three sections: Section 1 The rights protected by the Constitution of the United States are the rights of natural persons only. Artificial entities, such as corporations, limited liability companies, and other entities, established by the laws of any State, the United States, or any foreign state shall have no rights under this Constitution and are subject to regulation by the People, through Federal, State, or local law. The privileges of artificial entities shall be determined by the People, through Federal, State, or local law, and shall not be construed to be inherent or inalienable. Section 2 Federal, State and local government shall regulate, limit, or prohibit contributions and expenditures, including a candidate’s own contributions and expenditures, for the purpose of influencing in any way the election of any candidate for public office or any ballot measure. Federal, State and local government shall require that any permissible contributions and expenditures be publicly disclosed. The judiciary shall not construe the spending of money to influence elections to be speech under the First Amendment. Section 3 Nothing contained in this amendment shall be construed to abridge the freedom of the press. The V.R.A. A Voters’ Rights Amendment securing voter control over the government must not only reverse corporate personhood and provide for the control of money in politics, it must also clearly establish voter primacy as a matter of inherent constitutional right and it must include a solid foundation upon which to build a true and long-lasting representative democracy for future generations. Following is a working blueprint for such a structure: Section 4 The right of all adult citizens of the United States to cast effective votes in all elections is inherent under this Constitution and shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State. Section 5 During the calendar year preceding a presidential election, Congress shall solicit public comment regarding the political issues that most concern the People. Prior to the end of the calendar year preceding a presidential election, Congress shall adopt a joint resolution enumerating the 12 most critical policy questions that should be addressed by the next President and Congress. Failure of Congress to adopt a joint resolution prior to the end of the calendar year shall result in the disqualification of all sitting members of Congress to be eligible for reelection. Section 6 Federal elections conducted every second year for Senators and Representatives shall be held on a national voter’s holiday, with full pay for all citizens who cast a ballot. Federal elections shall be conducted on uniform, hand-countable paper ballots and, for the presidential election, ballots shall include the 12 most critical policy questions identified by Congress, each to be answered yes or no by the voters. Paper ballots shall provide space allowing voters to handwrite in their choice for all elective federal offices, if they choose, and all such votes shall be counted. Section 7 The States shall ensure that all citizens who are eligible to vote are registered to vote. In balancing the public benefit of maximum voter participation with the prevention of voting fraud, Congress and the States shall not impose any unreasonable restriction on registration or voting by the People. The intentional suppression of voting is hereby prohibited and, in addition to any other penalty imposed by law, any person convicted of the intentional suppression of voting shall be ineligible for public office for a period of five years. Transformation The United States Constitution once stood as a model for new nations; however, today it is viewed by many as an outdated and difficult-to-amend document that guarantees few rights, when compared to other established democracies. There is an inherent right in a representative democracy to cast an effective vote, and a failure by the government to protect that right nullifies the electoral process. By amending their constitution to ensure the primacy of voters and their right to control their government, the People of the United States will once again demonstrate an evolutionary model for democratic governments around the world. Transformation of the United States government to a true representative democracy is no longer an option. It is a matter of survival!

#### ---War turns the affirmative --- Military conflict always subordinates sovereignty to a particular project.

Irwin 2002

Alexander, Saints of the impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the politics of the sacred, pg

The military is and must be dominated by the principle of action, by the mode of behavior that in *Inner Experience* Bataille will designate as the project (*BOC* V, 59-60). “The army has only an active life. And one does not imagine ‘contemplative’ soldiers” (*BOC* VII, 251). “Action and decision spur the rapid rhythm of wars and the immediate forgetting of all horror. The conqueror must go quickly; he subordinates what he does to the result.” And in war, Junger’s rapturous proclamations notwithstanding, it is the result that matters, not the intensity of the participants’ experiences. “Terror and horror increase ecstasy, but the reduce the chances of destroying the enemy” (254-55). Powerful emotions are of the interest in a military context never as ends in themselves, but only insofar as they facilitate or hinder the attainment of strategic objectives, insofar as they render men more or less efforts as fighting machines. The subordination of all efforts to a defined goal endows war with a globally rational, purposive structure, despite the irrational violence that seethes in combat on a moment-by-moment basis. Wars are fought to be won. The overarching objective gives a sense to the sacrifices demanded of individuals and dulls the horror that would otherwise envelope them. “[I]n battle one approaches horror with a movement that overcomes it: action and the project linked to action permit one to *go beyond* [*depasser*} horror. This going beyond gives to action, to the project a captivating grandeur, but the horror in itself is denied” (*BOC* V, 58). This denial, Bataille wants to claim, belongs inevitably to the modern practice (if not to the “idea” [*ML,* 290]) of war. War functions in the modern world by presenting itself precisely not as unlimited horror, but as a necessary instrument for the attainment of practical ends (the continuation of politics by other means, in Clausewitz’s formula). Only under the most anomalous circumstances is war’s claim to utility unmasked, and then only fleetingly. This is why Bataille addresses to Junger a rather stunning reproach: “Nothing can stand against a natural law of things: *war does not want to be deepened* and the lyricism of horror suits it badly.”

### 1nc Donnie

#### \*\*Interpretation\*\* Debate is a space for mutually exclusive clash over the desirability of eliminating restrictions and increasing federal government incentives for energy production.

#### ---The resolution is the most predictable & educational place to locate the debate.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

Galloway (2007) also advances an argument concerning the privileging of the resolution as a basis for debating. Galloway (2007) cites three pedagogical advantages to seeing the resolution and the first affirmative constructive as an invitation to dialogue. “First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate” (p. 13). An important starting point for conversation, the resolution helps frame political conversations humanely. It preserves basic means for equality of access to base research and argumentation. Having a year-long stable resolution invites depth of argument and continuously rewards adaptive research once various topics have surfaced through practice or at debate tournaments.

#### ---The phrase “The United States federal government should” requires the affirmative to defend material policy change.

Ericson 2003

Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### ---The resolution requires switch-sides debate and is the single best educational tool for developing critical decision-making skills and finding personal meaning in argumentation.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

As discussed previously, sources of political information matters to how politically pluralistic the general public is. Mutz (2007) and Mutz and Martin (2001) fear the public is selfselecting both the source of their news along with their peer groups preventing the airing and hearing of multiple sides of an argument. This study suggests debate has two supportive roles to help resolve these fears. First, to debate outsiders, the resolution may appear obscure, boring, or isolated from their daily lives. For debaters, however, they must embrace the resolution and soon come to realize a rich complexity of argumentative potential permitting students (or teams and squads) to choose areas of the topic that are intellectually intriguing, competitively beneficial, and/or personally rewarding. The resolution then requires switch-side debating – enabling a depth of argument unrivaled by other high school experiences. Benefits to switchside debates have been offered by Galloway (2007), Harrigan (2008), and Mitchell (2010). Speaking to the intellectual flexibility required of policy debaters, this study concurs how switch side debating enables a range and intensity of argument and how switch-side debating indirectly encourages students to find personal meaning in argumentation. Many debaters interviewed compared their experiences to other high school opportunities and identified a depth of argument in debate unparalleled by civics, government, student councils, other simulation activities, or various service learning opportunities. The competitive necessity to anticipate and research all sides of an argument prior to being in a competitive round encourages a thorough examination of relevant political literature. In a debate rounds, debaters must listen to all of another’s argument, answer the argument at its best intention, consider strategic compromise on argumentation, anticipate the competitive direction of the argument, and directly compare arguments against each other. This practice demands a practice of open political inquiry. As a result of the demand for open inquiry, students are challenged “…to rethink unsubstantiated claims or arguing for positions they personally do not hold, playing devil’s advocate to make sure the full range of positions are well represented or to challenge a too-simple formation that has not grappled with possible objections” (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, and Corngold, 2007, p. 74). Second, debaters must present multiple sides of an issue. This practice enables hearing legitimacy in opposing argumentation as debaters do not have the luxury to entirely self selecting arguments for presentation or for defense. Thus, debate releases an umbrella of intellectual ideas. Once the ideas are released, debaters can develop personal advocacies and identities through argument. Even after establishing argumentative preferences, students recognized their success was tied to an intellectual flexibility to respond to numerous arguments. This study confirms the work of Galloway (2007) by establishing debate as a dialogical imperative whereby planning, listening, and responding may help establish empathy through seeing the humanity and credibility in one another’s arguments.

#### \*\*Violation\*\* The affirmative does not defend an increase in federal energy production. This is a reason to vote negative.

#### ---Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable argumentative clash without sacrificing the potential for creativity or openness.

Steinberg & Freeley 2008

Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### ---The preservation of clash comes before the evaluation of the affirmative --- The impossibility of objective knowledge means the political clash informs the basis for representations, discourse, epistemology and ontology; not the other way around.

Swyngedouw 2009

Erik, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic Politics of Environmental Production, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 33, Issue 3, pages 601–620

Political struggles are central in shaping alternative or different trajectories of socio-metabolic change and the construction of new and emancipatory urban environmental geographies. All manner of critical social-theoretical analyses have been mobilized to account for these processes. Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, environmental justice arguments, deconstructionist and poststructural musings, science/technology studies, complexity theory, postcolonial, feminist and Latourian views, among others, have attempted to produce what I would ultimately be tempted to call a ‘sociological’ analysis of urban political-ecological transformations. What they share, despite their different — and often radically opposed — ontological and epistemological claims, is the view that critical social theory will offer an entry into strategies, mechanisms, technologies of resistance, transformation and emancipatory political tactics. In other words, the implicit assumption of this sociological edifice is that ‘the political’ is instituted by the social, that political configurations, arrangements and tactics arise out of the social condition or process or, in other words, that the social colonizes ‘the political’ (Arendt, 1968). The properly political moment is assumed to flow from this ‘sociological’ understanding or analysis of the process. Or in other words, the ‘political’ emerges, both theoretically and practically, from the social process, a process that only knowledge has access to. Put differently, most urban political ecological perspectives assume the political to arise from analysis, but neither theorizes nor operationalizes the properly political within a political ecological analysis. This opens a theoretical and practical gap as the properly political is evacuated from the theoretical considerations that have shaped (urban) political ecology thus far. This ‘retreat of the political’ (Lefort, 1988; Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997) requires urgent attention. This retreat of the properly political as a theoretical and practical object stands in strange contrast to the insistence of urban political ecology that urban socio-environmental conditions and processes are profoundly political ones and that, consequently, the production of different socio-environmental urban trajectories is a decidedly political process. Considering the properly political is indeed all the more urgent as environmental politics increasingly express a postpolitical consensual naturalization of the political. As argued by Swyngedouw (2007a), Žižek (2002 [1992]) and Debruyne (2007), among others, the present consensual vision that the environmental condition presents a clear and present danger that requires urgent techno-managerial re-alignments and a change in the practices of governance and of regulation, also annuls the properly political moment and contributes to what these and other authors have defined as the emergence and consolidation of a postpolitical condition. These will be the key themes I shall develop in this contribution. First, I shall explore what might be meant by the ‘properly’ political. In conversation with, and taking my cue from, political philosophers and theorists like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Claude Lefort, David Crouch, Mustafa Dikeç, Chantalle Mouffe and Peter Hallward, I attempt to theorize and re-centre the political as a key moment in political-ecological processes. What these perspectives share is not only the refusal to accept the social as the foundation of the political, but, more profoundly, the view that the absence of a foundation for the social (or, in other words, the ‘social’ being constitutively split, inherently incoherent, ruptured by all manner of tensions and conflicts) calls into being ‘the political’ as the instituting moment of the social (see, e.g., Marchart, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2007). Put differently, it is through the political that ‘society’ comes into being, achieves a certain coherence and ‘sustainability’. Prioritizing ‘the political’ as the foundational gesture that permits ‘the social’ maintains ‘absolutely the separation of science and politics, of analytic description and political prescription’ (Badiou, quoted in Hallward, 2003a: 394). This is not to say, of course, that politics and science are not enmeshed (on the contrary, they are and increasingly so), but rather that unravelling the science/politics imbroglios (as pursued by, among others, critical sociologies of science, science and technology studies, science-discourse analysis and the like) does not in itself permit opening up either the notion or the terrain of the political. The aim of this article, in contrast, is to recover the notion of the political and of the political polis from the debris of contemporary obsessions with governing, management, urban polic(y)ing and its associated technologies (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1997).

#### ---Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue.

Hanghoj 2008

Thorkild, researcher for the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### ---Procedural energy policy research is a prerequisite to the affirmative --- Reformist research is critical to inform broader challenges to fossil fuel production.

Lohmann 2012

Larry, FINANCIALIZATION, COMMODIFICATIONAND CARBON:THE CONTRADICTIONS OFNEOLIBERAL CLIMATE POLICY, SOCIALIST REGISTER, http://thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Socialist%20Register%20Neoliberal%20Climate%20Policy%20Contradictions.pdf

Scapegoating ideology, however, is as double-edged as its cynical variety, or as the climate commodification process itself. Depending on political circumstances, calls for ‘better regulation’ or ‘crackdowns on corruption’ can intersect fruitfully with the more strategic, long-term campaigns for decommodification of the earth’s carbon-cycling capacity being undertaken by grassroots movements and groups such as Via Campesina, the California Movement for Environmental Justice, and movements in Ecuador, Canada and Nigeria opposing fossil fuel extraction.37 Useful information on patterns of subsidies provided to fossil fuel polluters by the EU ETS, or on the perverse incentives associated with HFC-23 projects, often come from groups clinging to the fetish of reform, and important analyses of the contradictions of the climate commodity from Wall Street consultants who would be horrified at the extent to which their contributions are aiding the understanding of radical movements against the trade. Thus while frank discussion of the consequences of the continuing unfolding of the contradiction between exchange-value and use-value in carbon markets is more politically productive when undertaken with affected publics than with fetish-constrained state officials and technocrats, or in the pages of the financial press, political spaces for breaking the trance that carbon markets have imposed on climate policy can be, and are being, opened at many levels.

#### ---Abdication of government political strategies makes political change impossible.

Stevenson 2009

Ruth, PhD, senior lecturer and independent consultant – Graduate School of the Environment @ Centre for Alternative Technology, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, pg. 512-526

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus. Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69). Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

#### ---Decision-making skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics.

Hager 1992

Carol J., professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### ---The impact outweighs --- deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats.

Lundberg 2010

Christian O. Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### ---Working within technocratic structure to reform the production process is the only way to hold corporate energy interests accountable for their crimes and democratize American energy policy.

Rahman 2011

K. Sabeel, A.B., Harvard College, 2005; M.Sc., Economics for Development, Oxford University, 2006; M.St., Sociolegal Studies, Oxford University, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2012; Ph.D. Candidate, Government, Harvard University, ENVISIONING THE REGULATORY STATE: TECHNOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTATION IN THE 2010 FINANCIAL REFORM AND OIL SPILL STATUTES, http://www.harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Rahman\_Note.pdf

These weaknesses of the technocratic model create a fundamental challenge for the modern regulatory state. One response to this challenge might be to abandon the project of regulatory public policy altogether. This is the familiar response from laissez-faire ideologies and anti-government conservatism. Yet the social goals that regulation aims to advance remain vital, even if the technocratic model itself proves problematic. As a society, we still need some form of accountability for the actions of powerful private entities like oil and financial corporations. We also require systems to protect against broad social risks like financial crisis and ecological disaster. In short, we require a form of collective self-rule against crises and social evils. Rather than rejecting the goal of mitigating these challenges, the weaknesses of technocratic regulation drive us towards the need to develop an alternative democratic paradigm of regulation. Indeed, these weaknesses of the technocratic impulse—disparities in interest representation, obfuscation of normative debates, demobilization of engagement—share three key features that suggest the need for and viability of a more democratic framework for regulatory politics. First, each of these weaknesses can be overcome through a more democratic regulatory structure. Second, this turn to democracy need not involve a rejection of expertise; rather, some form of democratic politics can coexist with a role for technical expertise. Third, each of these weaknesses arises out of an effort to rationalize regulatory policy. This rationalization effort aims to protect policymaking from the influence of politics, subsuming questions of values and interests into a more coherent process of regulatory policymaking. This good governance ideal is attractive, but the effort to sterilize policy of politics threatens deeper ideals of democracy, responsiveness, and legitimacy. Further, as critics of the modern regulatory state have noted, the involvement of politics is inescapable; regulatory agencies should be structured not to avoid politics but rather to engage with the reality of political disagreement openly. Instead of focusing on the narrow question of agency discretion and constraint with an eye towards promoting rationality of policymaking, the central question should be bringing the foci of political debate to the forefront and engaging in those debates in a democratic manner. Rather than attempting to sterilize policy of politics, this approach looks for ways to constitute a dynamic political process, one that leaves ample room for the representation and engagement of different values.

#### ---This empirically translates into real world policy change.

Mitchell 2010

Gordon R., Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf

Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.” 54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. this would by no means sideline or even exclude scientiic assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation. 55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.” 56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public debate” 57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical beneit for student participants, and irst-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientiic artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production. 58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication ield’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a dif erent route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English ield’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.

#### ---Resolution based policy debate foster critical thinking skills that empirically undermine the basis for American Exceptionalism.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

The background of many conversations relating to secondary education concerns the appropriateness of teaching politics. As referenced in chapter two, Daily (2006) and White (2009) stress the importance of early political identity formation. While the American polity recognizes the necessity of a political education both in the home and in the schools, the education received may not be as authentic as perceived. One immense benefit to the policy debate experience may relate to the time and space given to political identity formation (for those without an identity), re-formation (for those with a dissonant identity), or solidification of an existing identity (for those with a consistent identity). Switch-side debating combined with the personal distance from argument, provides a relatively safe space for playing with argumentation. Policy debate participation may uniquely answer White’s (2009) concern regarding the indoctrination of unquestioned patriotism, religiosity, and militarism in American schools. Participation in policy debate forces an intelligent academic defense, unraveling, or navigation through these concerns. Many debaters unlearn their ‘America can do no wrong’ perspective and develop an ability to understand and qualify American policy decisions both at home and abroad. This practice is inherently and genuinely political. As Colby (2008) concurs, political leaning does not compromise one’s political ideology but rather aids in intellectual integrity and clear critical thinking (p. 6). Revisiting Galloway (2007) emphasis on dialogue, debate helps students realize positions outside their own have meaning. This practice opens students up to new intellectual and academic perspectives and values. Overall, this study finds debate may help aid the development of an authentic political identity. “Evaluating competing arguments in this way causes students to think harder about things they have previously taken for granted” (Colby, Beaumont, Ehrlich, and Corngold, 2007, p. 115).

### 1NC Gender K

#### ---The affirmative’s gender neutral account of sacrifice masks the appropriation of female reproductive power and violence against women.

Roberts-Hughes 2008

Rebecca, Erotic transgression and sexual difference in Georges Bataille, Kings College, http://kcl.academia.edu/RebeccaRobertsHughes/Papers/139881/Erotic\_Transgression\_and\_Sexual\_Difference\_in\_Georges\_Bataille

As well as being sacrificial victims, in much of Bataille’s work women are related to and represent death and thus they often pave the path of transgression. In many poems Bataille explicitly links the female form with sex and death and often in his fiction the text reaches its climax (or one of its climaxes) in the suicide of a female lover of the protagonist, such as Marcelle in *Story of the Eye* or the protagonist’s mother in *My Mother*. In *Madame Edwarda* a prostitute claims she is God, and the sacred for Bataille is the realm outside humanity – the realm of death and continuity. That women are so central to eroticism and death in Bataille’s work is not surprising, since we have witnessed how he characterized them as the luxury used to forge the boundaries of society and upon which the incest taboo, which created human erotic activity, was placed. Secondly, like champagne they are a luxury excluded from the patriarchal world of work; this means they are a transgression: they are they path to continuity, they are death. Further, through their reproductive capacity, women are associated with the nature that humanity excludes; menstrual blood terrifies man because it reminds him of his natural, corporeal birth. As *erotic objects* and as *the embodiment of nature* women dissolve the boundaries of the subject since they are both *desirable* and *horrific*. This is how they come to represent (erotic) death for Bataille. For Irigaray this process is not the act of eroticism alone but the act performed by male theorists of eroticism, who have used women to create a self-glorifying conception of Eros that does not allow for sexual difference. In *Thinking the Difference* Irigaray states that our “path to reciprocal love between individuals has been lost, especially with respect to eroticism.” She holds that the dominant theory of Eros as “chaos, darkness, bestiality, sin, annihilation” and so on is a male form of experience which, in accessing the void and annihilating the subject, violently dissolves any potential for sexual difference. What Bataille venerates as a transitory state reached by eroticism (and the sacrifice of and fusion with the ‘female’), Irigaray disparages as the stagnant pit our erotic lives have fallen into. In limiting his account to male experience, and therefore to only one pole of sexual difference, Bataille fell into his own, male abyss corresponding not to any genuine otherness but to “the lack of rhythm and harmony of male desires, which specifically refuse any manifestation of the difference between the sexes so they can appropriate the fertility of the mother’s body.” Bataille’s male subject therefore not only sacrifices the female subject to reach his own dissolution and continuity but also to appropriate *in* this continuity, this realm of totality and fusion, her specifically female powers. Reproduction, as man’s corporeal tie to nature, has thus been appropriated by the male subject in a final denial of both nature *and* women. Reproduction has become the non-corporeal production of mankind, the (re)production of his community. The sacred is a new realm through which man relates himself to his surroundings, and takes the form of chaos because he imposes his own subjectivity upon the erotic ‘encounter’. In short, “man immerses himself in chaos because he refuses to make love *with* an other, to be *two* making love, to experience sexual attraction with tenderness and respect.” We have thus uncovered another problem in Bataille’s account of erotic transgression. We already understand that women are not subjects and therefore do not experience transgression outside subjectivity. Following Irigaray’s critique of Eros, we must add that the sacred realm outside subjectivity is a ‘continuity’ further denying women her difference, her own existence. Bataille wants to explore different relations to otherness that do not involve blindly denying that which we find horrific; subsuming otherness is not a way of achieving this. In terms of sacrifice, we must conclude that there is a threefold sacrifice of women. Mankind emerges because woman does not. Woman is sacrificed for society to exist (‘pledged to communication’) *and* for transgression to occur (she is murdered and he fuses with her death) *and* in the sacred realm of transgression (for the sake of his ecstatic communication with the universe, an ‘other’ part of himself woman came to represent to him) in which there can only be totality and no difference.

#### ---Reject the affirmative --- Only a strategy of feminist separatism can challenge the drive towards global destruction.mankind’s drive towards global destruction.

Weedon 1999

Chris, the Chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at Cardiff University, Feminism, theory, and the politics of difference, p. 90-93

In the order of reason which has governed Western thought since the rise of Ancient Greek philosophy, feminine otherness is denied and reconstituted as a male-defined otherness. This results in the denial of subjectivity to potentially non-male-defined women. A maternal feminine subjectivity, were it to be realized, would enable women to step outside of patriarchal definitions of the feminine and become subjects in their own right. Whereas the unconscious in Freud and Lacan lays claim to fixed universal status, for Irigaray its actual form and content is a product of history. Thus, however patriarchal the symbolic order may be in Lacan, it is open to change. The question is how this change might be brought about. For Irigaray, the key to change is the development of a female imaginary. This can only be achieved under patriarchy in a fragmented way, as what she terms the excess that is realized in margins of the dominant culture. The move towards a female imaginary would also entail the transformation of the symbolic, since the relationship between the two is one of mutual shaping. This would enable women to assume subjectivity in their own right. Although, for Irigaray, the imaginary and the symbolic are both historical and changeable, this does not mean that, after thousands of years of repression and exclusion, change is easy. In a move not unlike that of ecofeminists, Irigaray suggests that the symbolic order, men and masculinity are shaped by patriarchy in ways which are immensely problematic not just for women but also for the future of the planet. The apparently objective, gender-neutral discourses of science and philosophy — the discourses of a male subject — have led to the threat of global nuclear destruction. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993; original 1984), Irigaray suggests that the patriarchal male subject is himself shaped by the loss of the maternal feminine which motivates a desire for mastery: Man's self-affect depends on the woman who has given him being and birth, who has born/e him, enveloped him, warmed him, fed him. Love of self would seemingly take the form of a long return to and through the other. A unique female other, who is forever lost and must be sought in many others, an infinite number of others. The distance for this return can be conquered by the transcendence of God. The (female) other who is sought and cherished may be assimilated to the unique god. The (female) other is mingled or confused with God or the gods. (Irigaray 1993: 60-1; original 1984) Irigaray takes this theme further in Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution (1994; original 1989) when she suggests that the desire for godlike mastery and transcendence has dire consequences for the world: Huge amounts of capital are allocated to the development of death machines in order to ensure peace, we are told. This warlike method of organising society is not self-evident. It has its m origin in patriarchy. It has a sex. But the age of technology has given weapons of war a power that exceeds the conflicts and risks taken among patriarchs. Women, children, all living things, including elemental matter, are drawn into the maelstrom. And death and destruction cannot be associated solely with war. They are part of the physical and mental aggression to which we are constantly subjected. What we need is an overall cultural transformation. Mankind [le peuple des homines] wages war everywhere all the time with a perfectly clear conscience. Mankind is traditionally carnivorous, sometimes cannibalistic. So men must eat to kill, must increase their domination of nature in order to live or to survive, must seek on the most distant stars what no longer exists here, must defend by any means the small patch of land they are exploiting here or over there. Men always go further, exploit further, seize more, without really knowing where they are going. Men seek what they think they need without considering who they are and how their identity is defined by what they do. To overcome this ignorance, I think that mankind needs those who are persons in their own right to help them understand and find their limits. Only women can play this role. Women are not genuinely responsible subjects in the patriarchal community. That is why it may be possible for them to interpret this culture in which they have less involvement and fewer interests than do men, and of which they are not themselves products to the point where they have been blinded by it. Given their relative exclusion from society, women may, from their outside perspective, reflect back a more objective image of society than can men. (Irigaray 1994: 4—5; original 1989) The destructive force of the patriarchal symbolic order makes all the more pressing Irigaray's project of creating a female imaginary and symbolic, specific to women, which might in its turn transform the male-defined symbolic order in the West, in which women figure only as lesser men. In this process, separatism becomes a strategy in the struggle for a nonpatriarchal society in which sexual difference is both voiced and valued: Let women tacitly go on strike, avoid men long enough to learn to defend their desire notably by their speech, let them discover the love of other women protected from that imperious choice of men which puts them in a position of rival goods, let them forge a social status which demands recognition, let them earn their living in order to leave behind their condition of prostitute — these are certainly indispensable steps in their effort to escape their proletarianization on the trade market. But if their goal is to reverse the existing order - even if that were possible - history would simply repeat itself and return to phallocratism, where neither women's sex, their imaginary, nor their language can exist. (1994: 106; original 1989)

### Case

#### They are an example of bad scholarship

#### ---Bataille’s sociological account of excess affirms a primitivism that decontextualizes events and ignores the importance of utility to such acts.

Wolin 1996

Richard, LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Constellations Volume 2, Number 3, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf>

Yet, in his celebratory discussions of sacrifice, potlatch, and so forth, Bataille fundamentally misconstrues the historical and contextual parameters of such ritual practices. One could even go so far as to say that, in a certain measure, Bataille’s understanding of these phenomena succumbs to a type of “primitivism”: he decontextualizes the cultural practices he analyzes in order the better to incorporate them within his own theoretical agenda of his own critique of modernity. Here, Bataille seeks nothing less than “an anthropology that will itself provide a living - and orgiastic – myth to overturn, through its experience on a collective level, ‘modern’ sterile bourgeois society . **”51** Bataille chooses to view sacrifice and gift-giving in the first instance as gratuitous, non-utilitarian, or, as he puts it, “having no ends beyond themselves” - but this is far from the case. While he is correct in characterizing such practices as unrelated to the production of wealth, they are very much oriented toward ***the reproduction*** of ***existing relations*** of ***power.*** The act of human sacrifice as practiced among the Aztecs redounds to the credit of the sacrificer(s): it reinforces existing relations of authority, viz., the authority of those who are empowered to commission a sacrifice (in this case, the priests and aristocracy). It provides those in authority with a quasi-divine power to preside over life and death. In this sense, it is misleading to claim that sacrifice has no end beyond itself. An analogous criticism may be made of Bataille’s discussion of potlatch - the public, demonstrative destruction of wealth - and gift-giving. Only those who possess great wealth can in reality afford to destroy it. Consequently, the option to engage in potlatch does not exist for the poorer strata of such societies.52 Acts of potlatch are no less implicated in the reproduction of an existing social hierarchy. At issue is the reinforcement of the social status or prestige of the one who destroys his or her wealth. In almost all cases, those who practice potlatch are drawn from the upper strata of society. Those who must witness the potlatch are in effect humiliated: they are vividly reminded of their lowly rank in the social order. The same, of course, is true of the practice of gift-giving. The gifts in question are not freely bestowed, as it were, with no ulterior end in view. Bataille seizes on the aspect of gift-giving that serves his purposes. For, strictly speaking, gift-giving is not an economic transaction. It is neither an act of barter, nor does it aim at the enhancement of social wealth. Instead, with the gift it is ***social relations*** among persons that are in the first instance at issue. But the ***types*** of social relations at stake are relations of power. When given in accordance with social ritual, they always come with strings attached: unless the gift can be returned in kind, its social function is to humiliate the recipient. In fact, the entire object of gift-giving as a social ritual is to derogate and shame the recipient by virtue of his or her inability to return a gift of equal value. Gift-giving, too, then must be classified as a ritual practice that is in no sense gratuitous or free. Far from being an end in itself, as Bataille claims, it is fully implicated in the production and reproduction of social power. Such insights are amply confirmed in the writings of Mauss as well as in those of other ethnographers. To quote Mauss: But the motives of such excessive gifts and reckless consumption, such mad losses and destruction of wealth, especially in these potlatch societies, are in no way disinterested. Between vassals and chiefs, between vassals and their henchmen, *the hierarchy* is *established by means of these gifts.* To give is to show one’s superiority, to show that one is something more and higher, that one is *magister.* To accept without returning or repaying more is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient, to become *mit~ister.’~*

#### ---The existence of the sun does not prove their argument --- Energy provides an ontological basis for grace and ethics not waste and squander.

**Irwin** 200**2**

Alexander, Saints of the impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the politics of the sacred, pg 69

Weil’s notes on e4conomics of psychic and physical energy use the term “force” in a manner initially less indebted to military metaphors than to natural science. “Here below in the sensible universe there are only two forces: gravity on the one hand, and on the other all the energies that permit us to counterbalance gravity, and which all […] proceed from the sun, that is to say from the same source as light” (*C3*, 187). However, scientific ideas of force concern Weil above all because they enable an understanding of spiritual realities. It is “literally true” that “solar energy descends into plants and thus into abnimals, in such a way that we can eat it after having killed it” (198-99). Yet this literal truth encloses a deeper and more important insight. It concretely symbolizes divine grace, God’s endless self-giving. “We cannot capture solar energy. It is the energy that spontaneously transforms itself and takes a form in which we can seize it. This is an act of grace” (199). Weil’s analysis provides an intriguing counterpoint to Georges Bataille’s glorification of solar self-squandering. In his article on Van Gogh and automutilation (as in numerous other texts), Bataille had presented the sun’s endless outpouring of energy as the archetype of sacred (useless, irrational, self-expending) behavior. Weil, too, sees in the sun’s activity a sacrificial gesture readable simultaneously as physical fact and moral-religious allegory. Yet Weil downplays the gratuitous quality of the sun’s self-giving that so fascinated Bataille. Instead, Weil emphasizes the practical benefits that accrue to earthly creatures through the sun’s pouring forth of warmth and light. For Weil, the sun’s radiance becomes not a metaphor for irrational, violent excess, but a sacramental symbol expressive of God’s love.

#### ---Embracing sacrifice as a refusal of transcendent meaning follows the logic of catholic appropriation of sacrificial practices. The affirmative’s idealism opens the door for fundamentalist violence.

Arnould 1996

Elisabeth, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Diacritics 26.2

Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment. The philosophical and Christian version of sacrifice is understood as the spiritual transformation of a sacrificial moment the finite nature of which it denounces even as it appropriates its power. The Bataillian version, on the contrary, insists upon this finite moment in order to escape the dialectical comedy that transforms sacrifice into an ideal process. Performed in the name of spiritual rebirth, the sacrifices of Plato and Christ, for instance, reappropriate death by transfiguring it as resurrection. Grotesque and replete with horrors, death in Bataille appears alone on a stage whose cruelty is neither explained nor redeemed through transfiguration. Thus, Bataille withholds nothing from the scene of sacrifice but lets it emerge in the fullness of its amorphous violence. He valorizes its sanguinary horror in order to denounce the dialectic idealization of a death nothing should domesticate. He exhibits it "as it is": opaque, silent, and without meaning. According to Nancy, however, the valorization itself remains caught in the sacrificial logic of the idealist tradition. For, he argues, only in light of its ontotheological conceptualization can sacrifice become at once the infinite process of dialectical sublation and the blood-spattered moment this process both negates and sublates, simultaneously [End Page 87] avers and contests. The Bataillian thesis, granting efficacy and truth (reality) to sacrificial cruelty, is irremediably linked to the processes of dialecticization and spiritualization through which the philosophical and Christian West appropriates the power of sacrifice. It is the cruel counterpart of its idealization. And if this conception gives to sacrificial death an importance proportionally opposite to that which it receives from the Christian and philosophical transfiguration--since the finite truth of death plays at present the role of the infinite truth of resurrection--it still does nothing but repeat its ontotheological scheme. For it also pretends to find, on the cruel stage of sacrifice, a singular and more "real" truth of death. The stage of the torment is, for Bataille, that place where death appears with the full strength of a nonmeaning that can be exposed only through the immolation of the sacrificial victim. If this is so, then should we not suppose that this immolation pretending to give us the "inappropriable" truth of death's rapture appropriates in its turn the excess of the "excessive" meaning of this rapture? Does it not transform its excess into an "excessive truth," to be sure a negative one, though no less absolute than the philosophical and spiritual truths to which it opposes itself? At the heart of modern theories of sacrifice is thus, as Nancy puts it, a "transappropriation of sacrifice" by itself, even when, as is the case for Bataille, this theory tries to overcome sacrifice's spiritual operation through an excessive and volatile negativity. As soon as sacrifice thinks itself as revelation, be it that of a spiritual beyond or its negative counterpart, it remains a sacrifice in the name of its own transcendence, a loophole to a finitude powerless to think itself in terms other than those of a revelation: the revelation of a clear or obscure god, symbol of resurrection or of death's blind horror. If one wants to think finitude according to a model different from that of its sacrificial appropriation, one should think "apart from" sacrifice. If finitude is, as Bataille has himself wanted to think, an "access without access to a moment of disappropriation," then we must also call it "unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].

#### ---Bataille’s celebration of violence for violence sake is a form of anthropological romanticism that surrenders the political to fascism.

Wolin 1996

Richard, LEFT FASCISM: GEORGES BATAILLE AND THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, Constellations Volume 2, Number 3, <http://courses.ucsd.edu/nbryson/Graduate%20Readings/BatailleLeftFascism.pdf>

In the worldview of both Bataille and that of German young conservatives, war plays an essential, positive role. It serves as a means of dissolving the principium individuationis: the principle of bourgeois subjectivity, on which the homogeneous order of society - a world of loneliness and fragmentation - depends. For, according to Bataille, “the general movement of life is . . . accomplished beyond the demands of individual^."^^ It is in precisely this spirit that he celebrates the non-utilitarian nature of “combat” or “war” as a type of aestheticist end in itself: “Glory . . . expresses a movement of senseless frenzy, of measureless expenditure of energy, which the fervor of combat presupposes. Combat is glorious in that it is always beyond calculation at some moment.”33 For the same reasons, Bataille eulogizes those premodern “wamer societies in which ure, uncalculated violence and ostentatious forms of combat held sway.” For under such conditions, war was not made subservient to the vulgar ends of enterprise and accumulation, as is the case for modern-day imperialism, but served as a glorious end in itself. Yet, in the early 1930s, it was precisely this aestheticist celebration of “violence for violence’s sake,” or “war for war’s sake,” that Benjamin viewed as the essence of modem fascism. As he remarks in a well known passage : “Fiat arspereat mundus,” says fascism, and, as Marinetti admits, expects war to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been changed by technology. . . . Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order. This is the situation of politics which fascism is rendering ae~thetic.~’ In Bataille’s thought war serves as the harbinger of a cultural transfiguration in which the primacy of self-subsistent subjectivity would be replaced by the values of an “unavowable” or “ecstatic community”: that is, a community that would no longer be governed by the goals of a “visual culture” - transparency, self-identity, etc. - but instead, those of self-laceration, difference, and finitude. In fact, this Bataille-inspired program of an ecstatic community has been quite explicitly carried forth and explored in the political writings of Maurice Blanchot (La Communautk inavouable; 1983) and Jean-Luc Nancy (La Communautk dboeuvrke; 1985). Via his theory of “general economics” - which stands opposed to the “restricted,” rational-purposive orientation of a capitalist economy - Bataille, too, embraces a type of vitalism. In The Accursed Share, for example, he speaks confidently from the standpoint of “the exuberance of life,” of “the exuberance of living matter as a whole.”36 Yet, his is less a philosophical vitalism than that of a theorist of culture who allows himself to be guided by a certain anthropological romanticism: by a tendency to project anachronistically contemporary society’s need for wholeness and unity upon premodern forms of life that are on this account viewed in a quasi-utopian light. Bataille’s understanding of the prospects for a return of the sacred is relatively pluralistic. The revitalization of any one of a number of rites and occult practices that have been summarily banned by the rise of modernity’s “instrumentally rationalist culture” (Weber) will do. Thus, in Bataille’s theory of “expenditure” (dkpense), war is only one of a number of possibilities for radical cultural transgression; other possibilities include: luxury, mourning, war, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity (i.e., deflected from genital finality)” - all of these are, according to Bataille, “activities which, at least in primitive circumstances, have no end beyond themselve~.”~~ Yet, in addition to his endorsement of varieties of non-purposive ritual, Bataille is of sorts a disciple of negative theology. As a counterweight to modernity he is in favor of generalized profanation: any practice that furthers the ends of a “general” rather than “restricted economy” (where “economy” is anthropologically defined in terms of the general circulationof persons, goods, and symbols) will do. All instances of profanation that gratuitously disrupt the smooth functioning of productive consumption - the reign of the Tuuschprinzip - are eagerly welcomed. Hence, in Bataille’s work “the heterogeneous” (along with “sovereignty”) can best be defined ex negativo: as whatever stands opposed to or helps to undermine our modern cult of the homogeneous: contemporary capitalism and its anodyne cultural analogues (such as “art for art’s sake”), which know no wanton expenditure, but instead adhere to the bourgeois principle of equivalent exchange. However, as a result of the ethos of transgression that is propagated in Bataille’s work - a quasi-aestheticist valorization of transgression for transgression’s sake - one encounters serious normative lacunae. One might even go so far as to say, echoing Tony Judt, that aspects of Bataille’s thought are redolent of a more general and long-standing “vacuum at the heart of public ethics in France,” “the marked absence of a concern with public ethics or political morality.”38 I have already spoken of his work as an unsurpassable normative point of reference for much of post-structuralism. Here, “anti-normativism” itself becomes “normative,” insofar as rejection of the “norm” becomes itself a source of normativity. In recent years, as poststructuralists have begun meditating on the problem of how one would go about constituting a non-totalitarian political community - a communautk inavouable (Blanchot) or dksoeuvrke (J-L. Nancy), as it has been called - it is, unsurprisingly, to Bataille’s work that they have immediately turned.39 Yet, as Bernard-Henri LCvy has cautioned in relation to this avowedly illiberal, new “organicism” or “communitarianism”: Organicism. Naturalism. Refusal of universal values. Denial of values purely and simply. . . . It is on these bases, on this mute foundation, that one deploys a cover of horror that is more somber and infinitely more clamorous. . . . I will have attained my objective when I have succeeded in convincing that fascism is not in the first instance barbarism; that is it not essentially and to begin with the apocalypse; that it does not always and of necessity mean storms of iron and blood. Instead, it is in the first instance a type of society, a model of community, a manner of thinking and of organizing the social bond.40 It is precisely Bataille’s ecstatic model of community, his manner of “thinking and of organizing the social bond,” that I wish to call into question. It is a model that, fundamentally and undeniably, seeks to establish the normative basis of social action on an aesthetic foundation. As such its guiding ethos would be an aesthetics of transgression. Bataille’s ecstatic community would also be an aesthetic community: it would be a community in which the type of social action that would be valued above all would be action that yielded “no return,” action that - in the manner of art for art’s sake - had no end beyond itself. In the last analysis, the celebration of transgression for transgression’s sake remains unnuanced, unqualified, and uncritical. In lieu of a conceptual articulation of how one would begin to differentiate between, shall we say, salutary and retrograde instances of transgression, we are left with an ethos of shock, rupture, and disruption, purely and simply. In essence, Bataille - and those who have followed in his footsteps - seeks to ground an ethics of postmodernity in an avant-garde cultural practice that draws heavily on precapitalist forms of social life, precisely those forms that have been scorned and tabooed by the process of modernization. Indeed, the very desideratum of an adequate “conceptual articulation” of Bataillesque concepts such as “sovereignty,” “heterogeneity,” “expenditure,” and so forth would amount to a contrudictio in adjecto. In Bataille’s sense, the very call for principled legitimation would stand convicted a priori of indebtedness to the logic of “productive consumption,” to the values of a society predicated on instrumental reason and equivalent exchange. Such considerations return us to Habermas’s claim concerning the affinities between poststructuralism and the “young conservatives.” Both “transpose the spontaneous power of the imagination, the experience of self and affectivity, into the remote and the archaic; and in Manichean fashion, they counterpose to instrumental reason a principle only accessible via ‘evocation’: be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being or the Dionysian power of the poetic.” In other words, both “ground an intransigent antimodernism through a modernist attitude.”

#### ---The affirmative is in a double bind --- Either (a.) sacrifice is meaningless & there’s no impact or (b.) sacrifice has substance to open new forms of thought legitimizing genocide.

Minkoff 2007

C. Michael, “Existence is Sacrificeable, But It Is Not Sacrifice,” April 25, http://smartech.gatech.edu/dspace/bitstream/1853/14446/8/Michael%20Minkoff--LCC%204100--Animal\_Sacrifice.pdf

What Nancy admits is that “strictly speaking we know nothing decisive about the old sacrifice” and that “the Western economy of sacrifice has come to a close…it is closed by the decomposition of the sacrificial apparatus itself” (Nancy, 35). These confessions are significant because it indicates the fear that Nancy has of appropriating a symbol which has a remainder and a vector he cannot predict or control. What Bataille wanted from sacrifice was one thing, but Nancy fears that sacrifice carries its own valence. It is like the art that accedes to extinction, but suspends above it indefinitely. The force to accede to extinction is not guaranteed to suspend. The force that Bataille borrows from sacrifice is not guaranteed to behave in the way atheism dictates. Nancy reasserts that Western sacrifice always knew it sacrificed to nothing, but this latent knowledge makes the institution of sacrifice absurd, and Nancy is not willing to deny that sacrifice “sustained and gave meaning to billions of individual and collective existences” (Nancy, 35) What Nancy fears is this ignorance. He knows he does not understand the significance of the old sacrifice. If sacrifice was to no one and everyone knew it; why was and is it so universal and why have so many been tempted into believing its significance? But if one assumes that there is no one to whom one sacrifices, Bataille may not use sacrifice as the centerpiece of his philosophy because if sacrifice is not to anyone, it is not truly significant. If it is not significant or meaningful, it has no power. It becomes comedic. And it becomes massacre. That is why Nancy spends much of his time talking about the sacrifice of the Jews at Auschwitz. Without over-determining the significance, the sacrifice becomes a genocide or a holocaust. Bataille is trapped between two uncomfortable positions—let the blood continue to spill to make sacrifice real and significant and concrete, or deny the death the status of sacrifice, which in Bataille’s mind, would be to deny it realization. Nancy asks if Bataille’s “dialectical negativity expunges blood or whether, on the contrary, blood must ineluctably continue to spurt” (Nancy, 27). If Bataille spiritualizes sacrifice, it no longer has the power of real death, the concreteness of finiteness and the ability to rupture finitude. But if Bataille insists on the real death, he necessitates the constant spilling of blood in mimetic repetition until history is completed.

#### ---No link & turn --- Modern subjectivity makes sacrifice redundant and their obsession with combining secular society with premodern material violence is the foundation for Nazism.

Zizek 1996

Slavoj, The indivisible remainder: an essay on Schelling and related matters, pg 124-125

This notion of the modern, Cartesian subject *qua* the radical negativity of the double (self-relating) sacrifice also enables us to demarcate the paradoxical place of the theories of Georges Bataille, that is, of Bataille’s fascination with the ‘real,’ material sacrifice, with the different forms of holocaust and of the excessive destruction of (economic, social, etc.) reality. On the one hand, of course, Bataille’s topic is modern subjectivity, the radical negativity implied in the position of the pure transcendental subject. On the other hand, Bataille’s universe remains the pre-Newtonian universe of balanced circular movement or – to put it in a different way – his notion of subjectivity is definitely pre-Kantian: Bataille’s ‘subject’ is not yet the pure void (the transcendental point of self-relating negativity), but remains an *inner-worldly*, *positive force*. Within these co-ordinates, the negativity which characterizes the modern subject can express itself only in the guise of a violent destruction which throws the entire circuit of nature off the rails. It is as if, in a kind of unique short circuit, *Bataille* *projects the negativity of the modern subject backwards, into the ‘closed’ pre modern Aristotelian universe of balanced circular movement, within which this negativity can materialize itself only as an ‘irrational’, excessive, non-economical expenditure*. In short, what Bataille fails to take note of is that the modern (Cartesian) subject no longer needs to sacrifice goat’s intestines, his children, and so on, since *his very existence already entails the most radical (redoubled, self-relating) sacrifice, the sacrifice of the very kernel of his being*. Incidentally, this failure of Bataille also throws a new light on the sacrificial violence, the obsession with the ultimate twilight of the universe, at work in Nazism: in it, we also encounter the reinscription of the radical negativity characteristic of the modern subject into the closed ‘pagan’ universe in which the stability of the social order is guaranteed by some kind of repeated sacrificial gesture – what we encounter in the libidinal economy of Nazism is *the modern subjectivity perceived from the standpoint of the pre-modern ‘pagan’ universe.*

## \*\*\*2NC

### 2nc overview-Donnie

#### The roll of the ballot is to assess the desirability of a topical affirmative, the USFG should means this means the affirmative must defend the government increasing financial incentives or restrictions for one of the energies in the rez, that’s Ericson

#### The affirmative fails to meet this burden by allowing affirmatives to be “in the direction” of the resolution, this vague starting point denies equitable division of ground and slays predictability---the NITTY GRITTY MECHANICS of the rez is what we researched ALL summer and is therefore the best staring point---

#### --- 3 reasons --- (1.) All teams have equal access (2.) Defines year long preparation efforts that start even before the season officially begins & (3.) It was selected through open and democratic debate within the community itself. If they don’t like the resolution, they should have voiced their opinion during the topic selection process.

#### that’s Zwarensteyn

#### Fairness is a PRIOR question and a prerequisite to politics---

#### Roll of the negative, is to test the desirability of the affirmative, through this test emerges desirable political education derived from CLASH, where as their interpretation is the aff telling of us what they think is true about the world and then winning, under our interpretation voting affirmative requires that they defend their truth claim against a robust well prepared attack from the neg, this is the ONLY test that can prove their advocacy is desirable---that’s Steinberg and feely and zwarensteyn

#### Clash, all political knowledge occurs from clash, there is no transcendent truth handed down from the mountains, we are left with relative truths which can only be affirmed or denied with INFORMED dialogue---only after this process can a political position be formed, without a equitable roll for the negative you can’t assess the benefits of the aff, we didn’t have the required time to research their position---that’s swegadooo

#### To really sacrifice you should vote neg, them winning doesn’t result in any sacrifice, winning the ballot is a gain of calculative utility to getting to the next round, if they win their whole case the only way they can still win is if they lose

### Dean

#### ---Our framework solves their offense --- Debate over specific political acts embraces the positive aspects of sacrifice through the destruction of status quo policy.

Dean 2005

Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “The Politics of Avoidance: The Limits of Weak Ontology” Hedgehog Review, [jdeanicite.typepad.com](http://jdeanicite.typepad.com)

Butler’s ethics is grounded in the way we are given over to the other, in the other as a foreign kernel of our own being. In a sense, this other part of me is not fully foreign, fully other—he is part of me. I imagine him as my equal in the scene of address, we who may recognize each other and who are somehow each at the mercy of the other (58). We share a symbolic context. In contrast, the Lacanian act is self-grounding. The act suspends the symbolic network, rupturing the context of address and erasing the “I” that I am. Precisely here is the monstrosity of the act: the context that conditions me and within which I recognize the other is suspended. My relations are disturbed. In the act, I am not myself. The act is a catastrophe that happens to the me that I was and the relations in which I found myself. It transforms these relations, changing their terms, their contours, the very domain of the possible and permissible.i White would likely view this emphasis on the act as an instance of normative overload or an appeal to a messianic future. Yet this view would be mistaken for two reasons. First, the act is not intentional in any proper sense; it just happens. An act confronts us, we find ourselves in the position of having no choice but to act and accept full responsibility for our act nevertheless. So there is no normative overload here. Indeed, the opposite is the case insofar as there is no prior justification for an act: acts just occur and when they do they change their very contexts of emergence, the contexts on which justification depends. Second, the notion of the act is not messianic because from the perspective of what comes before the act, the displacement and transformation it affects, the dissolution of my sense of who and where I am, is so catastrophic, that an act necessarily “involves the choice of the Worse.”ii  It involves a kind of self-obliteration, the sacrifice of what is most dear, not as a result of calculation and planning, but in a free, incalculable move that one has no choice but to do.iii In politics, one does what one has to do, accepting responsibility, come what may.

### Solar Power v Solar Energy 1NC

#### A. Solar power means electricity from solar.

California Energy Commission Glossary no date (“Glossary of Energy Terms- Letter S,” accessed 7-20-12, http://www.energy.ca.gov/glossary/glossary-s.html)

SOLAR POWER - Electricity generated from solar radiation.

#### B. The aff is about solar energy not solar power

#### Power is electrical generation- energy is the actual light and heat from the sun.

Everblue Training no date (“Solar Energy Defined,”

http://www.everblue.edu/renewable-energy-training/getting-started-with-solar-and-wind-energy)

The definition of solar energy is that it is the radiant light and heat from the sun that has been harnessed by humans to create energy. The definition of solar power is electrical generation by means of heat engines or photovoltaics. Uses for solar power include but are not limited to: space heating and cooling, water distillation, daylighting, hot water, thermal energy for cooking, and more.

#### C. Vote Negative- Our interpretation protects core cases on the topic like Feed-in-Tariffs and tax credits for solar power. Their interpretation explodes the topic by conflating power and energy. It literally allows ANYTHING UNDER THE SUN like sun worship, sun bathing, passive heating like sky lights. They cannot access the race to the middle by referencing the sun because that places no meaningful limit on the topic.

AND USFG IS THE GOVERNMENT IN DC, that is the only one we can reasonably predict, the fg of the flesh wasn’t in the topic paper, the one in dc is where we based all of our ground from, they elimate the potential to read disads which are key to cost

#### ---Agenda disadvantages are educationally advantageous --- Creates a structural incentive for debaters to be politically informed and increases in-depth analysis of the American political process.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

One argument consistent throughout debater responses highlights the importance or even the frustration with a negative disadvantage known broadly as ‘politics.’ As an affirmative presents their plan, the negative has the right to introduce a series of arguments highlighting disadvantages to the affirmative’s proposal. This happens within the structure of a disadvantage itself – as it contains a statement of what negative consequences may occur should the plan be enacted. These bridges, or links, function to reveal the political chain reaction of the plan. The politics disadvantage may start as broadly as asking if the executive or the legislative branch may take credit or blame for a specific policy and how that may impact its own political agenda. As one debater referenced, he was keen on debating specific legislative and executive agendas because the politics disadvantage offered a way to introduce politically relevant and contentious topics including the Law of the Sea Treaty, Equal Pay Act, Affordable Health Care, nuclear arms reduction treaties, and much more. If a plan was implemented, the negative may argue it created a political backlash or drained a president’s political capital making him less able to advocate for a specific agenda item. Knowledge of the political docket, political horse-trading, and how policies may be framed for political gain requires debaters to know not only the merits of specific agenda items but also to identify where the president and key members of Congress stand on specific issues. Knowing the process, committee members, and their stances on political issues is a natural process for the debater. Almost every debater identified this process as self-motivating. Many knew that whether they initiated this debate or instead just had to answer the disadvantage, they had internalized the need to research this political knowledge.

Zwarensteyn 2012

Ellen C., Masters Candidate in Communications at Grand Valley State University, High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning, Masters Theses. Paper 35, http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/theses/35

As a result, the depth of knowledge spans questions not only of what, if anything, should be done in response to a policy question, but also questions of who, when, where, and why. This opens the door to evaluating intricacies of government branch, committee, agency, and even specific persons who may yield different cost-benefit outcomes to conducting policy action. Consider the following responses: I think debate helped me understand how Congress works and policies actually happen which is different than what government classes teach you. Process counterplans are huge - reading and understanding how delegation works means you understand that it is not just congress passes a bill and the president signs. You understand that policies can happen in different methods. Executive orders, congress, and courts counterplans have all helped me understand that policies don’t just happen the way we learn in government. There are huge chunks of processes that you don't learn about in government that you do learn about in debate.

### 2nc nancy

### A2 Secomb/Community Bad --- 2nc Framework

#### --- Secomb Votes Neg --- By denying the resolution as a focal point of clash infavor of an open and inclusive discussion, the affirmative transforms debate into a totalizing community where we can all agree to debate everything.

Secomb 2000

Linnell, Their Author, lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney, Fractured Community, Hypatia Vol. 15, No. 2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v015/15.2secomb.html

Against these formulations of unified community, I propose in this paper an interpretation of community as an expression of difference and diversity that is made manifest through disagreement and disunity. While disagreement is generally conceived as a threat to community and as a sign of the imminent collapse of community, I will argue instead that disagreement disrupts the formation of a totalizing identity, or commonality. The creation of a totalizing unity is the movement of totalitarianism and unfreedom. Disagreement, on the other hand, holds a space open for diversity and for freedom. It is not disagreement, resistance, and agitation that destroy community. It is rather the repression or suppression of difference and disagreement in the name of unity and consensus which destroys the engagement and interrelation of community.

#### ---Limits are key to respectful engagement with alterity.

Secomb 2000

Linnell, Their Author, lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney, Fractured Community, Hypatia Vol. 15, No. 2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v015/15.2secomb.html

However, while community is characterized by sharing it is also the experience of limit and difference. The singularity that the free sharing of community produces is a finite and mortal being: in the relation to the heterogeneity of community the singular being is exposed to limit--to birth, death, and alterity--and in this exposure the singular being finds not fusion, union, or communion with others, but limit and difference. The finitude, the death, exposed in community does not constitute community as the fusion of autonomous subjects but the being-together of singular finite beings. The limit and singularity of the self and the alterity of the other are revealed in the finitude and limit of the other. This finitude is exposed through birth and death; this limit is enacted through the touch that identifies the boundaries of the other's skin, and through the binding and unbinding, the caress and the scorching, of love, passion, and loss. These limits reveal both the alterity of the other and the engagement with this different being. Community is a sharing evoked by the exposure to these terminations and boundaries (Nancy 1991, 26-28). This community of singular beings, who are exposed to each other in the sharing of community and attain existence in the context of this exposure, is not an entity or a static essence. Neither is it a common project or a joint production by human existences. Community is not a work or a project constructed together after negotiated agreement. Community, Nancy suggests, "cannot arise from the domain of work. One does not produce it, one experiences or one is constituted by it as the experience of finitude" (1991, 31).

### ---Turns Bataille --- 2nc Turns the Case

#### ---Political planning is inevitable --- The affirmative’s refusal of government politics ignores the interconnected nature of waste and order; placing excess at the head of a new totalitarian project towards the future. Only our framework allows for the planned planlessness necessary for authentic meaning.

Stoekl 1990

Allan, Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness, Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 181-205

In both of these cases-the Aztec priest and the gangster-one notes that the figure's violence and subversion is doubled by erection centrality, and order; the Aztec's pyramid, the skyscraper associated with the gangster, are the organizing principles, the metonyms, of societies that are brutal and deliriously forceful, even if in decline. And one could say exactly the same thing about the "acephale": "he" is a figure that bears death, but at the same time "he" is a perfectly coherent and traditional "sacred figure" around which a society, albeit one of conspirators, can be established. "He" is not only the figure of an order, but (like the pyramid or skyscraper) a principle of order. One sees the representation of this political ambivalence-for want of a better word-in the famous "Acephale" drawing of 1936, by Andre Masson (VE, 180): while the head is clearly missing, the stars (nipples), bowels and death's head (genitals) only go to create another face, another "figure humaine." Further, the death's head itself has a miniature face.... The "acephale," in other words, has lost a head, a principle of organization and order, only to mutate and develop an- other, more hypnotic, doubled and doubling (replicating) face. It is no coincidence that, after the outbreak of the war, Bataille gave up the "whim" of starting a new religion and a new "order."22 As we see from the American example, "sacred figures and myths" seem to have a way of reversing themselves and turning into icons of centrality and oppression. Bataille's later fragmentary writings, in the Somme Atheologique, bear witness to his recognition of the need to disrupt any coherent movement, doctrine, or representation, no matter how "acephalic" it might be. But a renunciation of the marginal or elite "order" in Bataille's case returns him, surprisingly enough, in the last chapter of The Accursed Share (1949), to a certain affirmation of "planisme," and specifically to a celebration of the very culture that his Aztec priests and Chicago mobsters had seemed in principle to subvert: the planned American economy of the "New Deal." Does this mean that Bataille was simply jumping from one proto- fascism to another? After all, as Zeev Sternhell has shown, the links between "planisme," Lagardelle (the editor of Plans), "Ordre Nouveau," Henri de Man and, finally, collaboration with the Nazis are clear enough. By jettisoning democratic safeguards, and valorizing a conciliatory social "fusion" at the expense of the proletariat and the class struggle, "socialist" thinkers (and political leaders) like Henri de centrally directed as a de Man would have wished, whose net effect was to involve the government actively on the side of poor workers and farmers, thereby coopting (as the European "planistes" hoped to do) "harder core" Socialists and Communists. Thus the New Deal was much more interested in class cooperation than class conflict: the directors of the famous FSA photographic project, for example, sent Walker Evans and many others out into the field-literally-to record southern poverty, and the photographs they made were then seen by northern workers, with the resulting (at least hoped-for) bond of fraternity motivating both groups to vote for Roosevelt. The important thing, here, is that they would vote: the New Deal was never as authoritarian or as centralized as the "Plans" of the de Mans and Dandieus; some form of representative democracy was retained. Of course at the time many groups on both the left and the right in Europe considered post-1933 Washington, D.C. to be just another fascist, or at least totalitarian, capital.24 The very haphazardness of Roosevelt's "try anything" approach, however, and the retention and even strengthening of democracy by the New Deal and its avatars (the Voting Rights Act of 1965) disproved that. Pace Sternhell, then, a "planisme" could be, and was, developed in the prewar period that did not necessarily lead to fascism, that was "centralized" but was not authoritarian. One can argue that there is nothing intrinsically "fascist" in "planisme"; it can just as easily be "acephalic" as rigidly hierarchical. Indeed it was Roosevelt's successor, Truman, who, after the war, came to replace the "acephale" for Bataille as the figure of political and economic (disiorganization. "end" of planning is planlessness, the "self-consciousness" that has "nothing as its object," that is the "nothing of pure expenditure" (AS, 190). Bataille here, at the end of the chapter, reiterates the argument from "The Psychological Structure of Fascism": accumulation is sub-ordination to some future goal. (It is, in the terms of that essay, homo- geneous.) But Bataillean self-consciousness is a "becoming conscious of the decisive meaning of an instant in which increase (the acquisition of something) will resolve into expenditure" (AS, 190). Just as the most elaborately conceived planning is inseparable from potlatch, so too the most integrated, nonindividuated consciousness (the consciousness that arises at the end of history, through an impossible "awareness" of the [non] "object" of the Marshall Plan) is indissociable from the nothingness it "knows." At this point one can see how Bataille's economic project folds back into the secular mystical experience of the Somme Atheologique.

#### ---We solve their offense --- It’s all written in reference to European style socialism whereas the American political system we defend is thoroughly permeated by excess & waste which Bataille thought was the beez kneez.

Stoekl 1990

Allan, Truman's Apotheosis: Bataille, "Planisme," and Headlessness, Yale French Studies, No. 78, On Bataille (1990), pp. 181-205

Bataille has discarded his earlier fetishes, such as the proletariat in the street ("The solving of social problems no longer depends on street uprisings" [AS, 186]) and "'visions,' divinities and myths" (AS, 189). Now lucidity will guarantee both economic development, peace, and the end of economic selfishness. Finally, the very necessity of central planning will make America look like the Soviet Union in that the former will accord more importance to state-planned and financed production. "It [the US] defends free enterprise, but it thereby increases the importance of the state. It is only advancing, as slowly as it can, toward a point where the USSR rushed headlong" (AS, 186). Some form of socialism will be developed in the US, then, as the opposing parties come to resemble each other. But, implicitly at least, Bataille is arguing that an American Stalinism will not arise from this situation, because this state control is devoted not to accumulation (as in Russia) but to expenditure. If the Marshall Plan, and the similar plans that will follow, necessarily negate purely individual concerns and enterprises, then socialist state planning will be inseparable from the giving away of massive amounts of wealth, from potlatch. Even though law and directives will determine activity, the Stalinist "head" will be replaced by a "headlessness." Or we can say, following Bataille's logic, that this nonauthoritarian direction, this "acephalite," is already in place in America, since the Marshall Plan has been set in motion not by a "head," an oppressive command, but by Roosevelt's successor, who is precisely unaware of what he is doing: "Today Truman would appear to be blindly preparing for the final-and secret-apotheosis" (AS, 190). Confrontation will continue between the superpowers-it is integral to the model of potlatch, which is now being elaborated on an international scale-but coercive control, at least in America, seems a thing of the past.

### 2nc police

#### ---we are in no way analogues to the police

#### They can contest our charges---

#### They got to make the argument, the judge will evaluate it

#### If the ballot is policinhg, its inevitable because you have to vote for one team

#### They police the neg---IN A MORE COVERT WAY

Day 1966

Dennis, Assistant professor and director of forensics @ U. of Wisconsin, Madison, *central states speech journal,* “The Ethics of Democratic Debate” v17 p8

The ethic suggested here is similar to another ethical position which is widely accepted. Most readily acknowledge an ethical responsibility to oppose overt attempts to silence debate or suppress the expression of minority and unpopular views, even when such attempts are made in the name of personal conviction. Most fail, however, to recognize the more subtle and dangerous form of suppression which takes place in the name of personal conviction: an individual’s failure to give effective expression to an argument which is not otherwise being effectively expressed, because the argument is in opposition to his personal conviction on a problem. The act of suppression is no less harmful to the decision-making process because it is covert instead of overt. The social effects are the same: decision based on incomplete debate. The covert suppression of argument and information is as ethically culpable as is overt suppression. And personal conviction is no justification for either. Covert suppression is the greater threat to democratic processes because it is clandestine and is more difficult to overcome because of the ego involvement that usually accompanies personal conviction.

### 2nc coherence

#### ---The affirmative fails to fail --- The minute any of their argument forms coherence it becomes worthless self-indulgence.

Mann 1999

Paul, *Masocriticism*, pg 67-69

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption’” can never become an explicit critical motive. At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye. Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. **Excess is not a project but a by-product of *any* discourse**; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory *squeal like a pig* before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no *knowledge* of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take an even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one is hip to heterology or does it by accident, whether one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relationto the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, or the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or *depensives* in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss. Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies.

### 2nc switch side debate good

#### Switching sides doesn’t require you check your identity at the door, if you don’t think you should have to work with the state you can argue the state should stop intervening in energy policy by reducing restrictions.

#### Moreover, arguing both sides does not mean you have to stop having an identity, it is the same as keeping an open mind, their argument are analogous to the dogmatic positions that racists and homophobs take “I don’t hate gay black people, they just go against my personal beliefs

English et al 2007

Eric English, Stephen Llano, Gordon R. Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief and Carly Woods, Communications—University of Pittsburg “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Volume 4, Number 2, June, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan , which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat defini- tions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent \*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

---SSD allows us to TEST ideas and experiment with arguments---the static fixedness under their interpretation cannot result in the same educational benefits

Koehle 2010

Joe, Phd candidate in communications at Kansas, former West Georgia debater, http://mccfblog.org/actr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Koehle\_Paper\_ACTR-editedPDF.pdf.

Much like criticism of the sophists has persisted throughout time; criticism of switch side debate has been a constant feature since the advent of tournament-style debating. Harrigan documents how numerous these criticisms have been in the last century, explaining that Page 15 Koehle 15 complaints about the mode of debate are as old as the activity itself (9). The most famous controversy over modern switch side debate occurred in 1954, when the U.S. military academies and the Nebraska teachers‟ colleges decided to boycott the resolution: “Resolved: That the United States should extend diplomatic relations to the communist government of China.” The schools that boycotted the topic argued that it was ethically and educationally indefensible to defend a recognition of communists, and even went so far as to argue that “a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country‟s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends and to distortion by our enemies” (English et al. 221). Switch side debate was on the defensive, and debate coaches of the time were engaged in virulent debate over the how to debate. The controversy made the national news when the journalist Edward Murrow became involved and opined on the issue in front of millions of TV viewers. English et al. even go so far as to credit the “debate about debate” with helping accelerate the implosion of the famous red- baiting Senator Joseph McCarthy (222). The debate about debate fell back out of the national spotlight after the high-profile incident over the China resolution, but it never ended in the debate community itself. The tenor of the debate reached a fever pitch when outright accusations of modern sophistry (the bad kind) were published in the Spring 1983 edition of the National Forensic Journal, when Bernard K. Duffy wrote, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative Appraisal.” Echoing the old Platonic argument against sophistic practice, Duffy argued that switch side debate has ignored ethical considerations in the pursuit of teaching cheap techniques for victory (66). The 1990‟s saw a divergence of criticisms into two different camps. The first camp was comprised of traditional critics who argued that debate instruction and practice promoted form over substance. For example, a coach from Boston College lamented that absent a change, “Debate instructors and their students will become the sophists of our age, susceptible to the traditional indictments elucidated by Isocrates and others” (Herbeck). Dale Bertelstein published a response to the previously cited article by Muir about switch side debate that launched into an extended discussion of debate and sophistry. This article continued the practice of coaches and communications scholars developing and applying the Platonic critique of the sophists to contemporary debate practices. Alongside this traditional criticism a newer set of critiques of switch side debate emerged. Armed with the language of Foucauldian criticism, Critical Legal Studies, and critiques of normativity and statism, many people who were uncomfortable with the debate tradition of arguing in favor of government action began to question the reason why one should ever be obliged to advocate government action. They began to argue that switch side debate was a mode of debate that unnecessarily constrained people to the hegemony of debating the given topic. These newer criticisms of switch side debate gained even more traction after the year 2000, with several skilled teams using these arguments to avoid having to debate one side of the topic. William Spanos, a professor of English at SUNY Binghamton decided to link the ethos of switch side debate to that of neo-conservatism after observing a debate tournament, saying that “the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush…learned their „disinterested‟ argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed.” (Spanos 467) Contemporary policy debate is now under attack from all sides, caught in its own dissoi logoi. Given the variety of assaults upon switch side debate by both sides of the political spectrum, how can switch side debate be justified? Supporters of switch side debate have made many arguments justifying the value of the practice that are not related to any defense of sophist Page 17 Koehle 17 techniques. I will only briefly describe them so as to not muddle the issue, but they are worthy of at least a cursory mention. The first defense is the most pragmatic reason of all: Mandating people debate both sides of a topic is most fair to participants because it helps mitigate the potential for a topic that is biased towards one side. More theoretical justifications are given, however. Supporters of switch side debate have argued that encouraging students to play the devil‟s advocate creates a sense of self-reflexivity that is crucial to promoting tolerance and preventing dogmatism (Muir 287). Others have attempted to justify switch side debate in educational terms and advocacy terms, explaining that it is a path to diversifying a student‟s knowledge by encouraging them to seek out paths they may have avoided otherwise, which in turn creates better public advocates (Dybvig and Iversen). In fact, contemporary policy debate and its reliance upon switching sides creates an oasis of argumentation free from the demands of advocacy, allowing students to test out ideas and become more well-rounded advocates as they leave the classroom and enter the polis (Coverstone). Finally, debate empowers individuals to become critical thinkers capable of making sound decisions (Mitchell, “Pedagogical Possibilities”, 41).

#### ---Switch side debate empirically improves policymaking --- EPA water policy.

Mitchell 2010

Gordon R., Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchell2010.pdf

Yet the picture grows more complex when one considers what is happening over at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where environmental scientist Ibrahim Goodwin is collaborating with John W. Davis on a project that uses switch-side debating to clean up air and water. In April 2008, that initiative brought top intercollegiate debaters from four universities to Washington, D.C., for a series of debates on the topic of water quality, held for an audience of EPA subject matter experts working on interstate river pollution and bottled water issues. An April 2009 follow-up event in Huntington Beach, California, featured another debate weighing the relative merits of monitoring versus remediation as beach pollution strategies. “We use nationally ranked intercollegiate debate programs to research and present the arguments, both pro and con, devoid of special interest in the outcome,” explains Davis. “In doing so, agency representatives now remain squarely within the decision-making role thereby neutralizing overzealous advocacy that can inhibit learned discourse.”

#### ---Doesn’t turn us into Karl Rove---being able to see BOTH sides of an issue allows us to find the flaws and inconsistencies with racist, exeptionalist arguments, we can wade through bad arguments when we are forced to make them, that’s Zwarsteyn.

#### ---Rejecting switch side debate makes exclusion covert without improving the quality of debates.

Day 1966

Dennis, Assistant professor and director of forensics @ U. of Wisconsin, Madison, *central states speech journal,* “The Ethics of Democratic Debate” v17 p8

The ethic suggested here is similar to another ethical position which is widely accepted. Most readily acknowledge an ethical responsibility to oppose overt attempts to silence debate or suppress the expression of minority and unpopular views, even when such attempts are made in the name of personal conviction. Most fail, however, to recognize the more subtle and dangerous form of suppression which takes place in the name of personal conviction: an individual’s failure to give effective expression to an argument which is not otherwise being effectively expressed, because the argument is in opposition to his personal conviction on a problem. The act of suppression is no less harmful to the decision-making process because it is covert instead of overt. The social effects are the same: decision based on incomplete debate. The covert suppression of argument and information is as ethically culpable as is overt suppression. And personal conviction is no justification for either. Covert suppression is the greater threat to democratic processes because it is clandestine and is more difficult to overcome because of the ego involvement that usually accompanies personal conviction.

#### ---we don’t link to this offense because we affirm the resolution sometimes, since we negate when we are negative we see both sides of the issue, the only team that doesn’t operate within this paradigm is the aff

### ---A2 Predictability Bad --- 2nc Framework

#### ---No Link --- Our demand is for a predictable staring point for discussion, NOT that every argument must be known ahead of time --- Extend the 1nc Zwarensteyn evidence --- This is distinct from the ‘predictability’ they reference since it lacks the totalizing knowledge requirement their evidence indicates is a prerequisite to violence.

#### ---Predictable grounding for debates is good --- The alternative is a collapse of dialogue and the production of an ineffectual politics wedded to violence.

Shively 2000

Ruth Lessl, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 182-3

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. For agreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

## \*\*\*1NR

### \*\*\*CP

### 2nc Counterplan

Our counterplan is to have the flesh of the united states federal government hold a referendum over whether or not to engage in glorious sacrifice of our flesh.

Only the counterplan solves

(A.) Spliting the affirmative’s flesh into an active body & a consultative body is the only way to actualize the doubling claims advanced in their Hansen & Stepputat evidence --- The act of holding a binding referendum with ones self splits our flesh into two creating an excessive state of subjectivity that is able to break out of it’s restricted sense of utility and achieve real joy & value. Only the counterplan solves this because the affirmative imagines a unified view of the flesh of the federal government where it can only be one actor doing one thing. Only the counterplan’s internal tension can to destabilize this unified body and make way for glorious excess.

(B.) The incoherence of the counterplan is the reason we solve --- The tensions and confusions created by the internal split between the consulting and acting federal government creates a beuocratic excess who’s purpose alludes strict definition.

The net benefit is their catastrophic excess claims --- Without engaging in the meaningless policy procedures and minutia, our Cox evidence says the urge towards excess gets pushed towards military calculations and violence.

This war turns the aff --- Military conflict always subordinates sovereignty to a particular project.

Irwin 2002

Alexander, Saints of the impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the politics of the sacred, pg

The military is and must be dominated by the principle of action, by the mode of behavior that in *Inner Experience* Bataille will designate as the project (*BOC* V, 59-60). “The army has only an active life. And one does not imagine ‘contemplative’ soldiers” (*BOC* VII, 251). “Action and decision spur the rapid rhythm of wars and the immediate forgetting of all horror. The conqueror must go quickly; he subordinates what he does to the result.” And in war, Junger’s rapturous proclamations notwithstanding, it is the result that matters, not the intensity of the participants’ experiences. “Terror and horror increase ecstasy, but the reduce the chances of destroying the enemy” (254-55). Powerful emotions are of the interest in a military context never as ends in themselves, but only insofar as they facilitate or hinder the attainment of strategic objectives, insofar as they render men more or less efforts as fighting machines. The subordination of all efforts to a defined goal endows war with a globally rational, purposive structure, despite the irrational violence that seethes in combat on a moment-by-moment basis. Wars are fought to be won. The overarching objective gives a sense to the sacrifices demanded of individuals and dulls the horror that would otherwise envelope them. “[I]n battle one approaches horror with a movement that overcomes it: action and the project linked to action permit one to *go beyond* [*depasser*} horror. This going beyond gives to action, to the project a captivating grandeur, but the horror in itself is denied” (*BOC* V, 58). This denial, Bataille wants to claim, belongs inevitably to the modern practice (if not to the “idea” [*ML,* 290]) of war. War functions in the modern world by presenting itself precisely not as unlimited horror, but as a necessary instrument for the attainment of practical ends (the continuation of politics by other means, in Clausewitz’s formula). Only under the most anomalous circumstances is war’s claim to utility unmasked, and then only fleetingly. This is why Bataille addresses to Junger a rather stunning reproach: “Nothing can stand against a natural law of things: *war does not want to be deepened* and the lyricism of horror suits it badly.”

### A2 Permutation

---The affirmative doesn’t get permutations and they link to the aff --- the only reason why a permutation is desirable is if the purpose of the debate is to achieve the most utilitarian and efficient outcome --- to test the mutual exclusivity of two options through an assessment of their capacity to produce efficient results. This results in the military efficiency and catastrophic use of energy in wars described in their stoekl evidence.

**Fortuna** 200**9**

John, Ph.d candidate in Political Philosophy and International Relations, UC-Santa Barbara, “Loss and Sacrifice in the Thought of Georges Bataille (And their Political Implications),” Prepared for the Conference of the Western Political Science Association, March 19-21, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p317285\_index.html

Such an understanding of loss provides a unique though difficult alternative to the typical ways in which loss, particularly sacrificial loss, is understood within the contemporary political context. It is usually the case that calls for sacrifice, when made at all, are couched in a rhetoric that at least implicitly seeks to sell that call to sacrifice. In other words, calls to sacrifice (and hence calls to lose) are often accompanied with arguments and explanations of the eventual gains that will result from the sacrificial loss that one is being asked to currently undergo. The Bataillean position would **reject such attempts** to sell others on sacrifice for a number of reasons, perhaps the most important of which is that these attempts misrepresent what it means to sacrifice in the first place. Sacrifice and loss for Bataille have nothing in common with an economic rationale that thinks only in terms of means/ends relationships. By separating sacrifice and loss from a logic of utility Bataille at the very least clarifies what it really means to engage in a sacrifice. Sacrifice is no longer simply a stand-in for what is really an economic logic of trade-offs. Bataille clearly means to highlight the anguish and pain involved in sacrificial loss by incorporating the figure of death into his analysis. Just as physical death represents a kind of ultimate finality, the loss experienced in sacrifice is similarly final—one does not relinquish in sacrifice with the thought of what one might gain from doing so; it is rather the case that one simply sacrifices. Sacrifice is not about trading off one good or value in favor of another; but instead consists in the absolute relinquishment of a given good or value—and the mental and psychological states which accompany such a relinquishment. Conceptualizing loss in this way more accurately illuminates for citizens what is really at stake when the operation of politics may at certain times ask, and at other times command, that one engage in sacrifice20.

### \*\*\*K

### OV

#### **Gender neutral concepts of sacrifice for the sake of excess and achieving a state of being and understanding that is considered necessary for the appreciation of life causes society to collapse against women due to its inherent proclivity towards the sacrifice of the female – this masculine bias sustains the forces of patriarchy and co-opts access to their impact claims because their ignorance of masculine identities that are locked in opposition to women means they only solve for 50% of the population –that’s hughes**

#### Weeden says institution of patriarchy through gender neutral criticisms results in environmental destruction, nuclear conflict and unethical practices of dehumanization – this is an extinction DA against the aaffirmative

#### Alt means we solve the understanding of flesh better than the affirmative- absent acceptance of sexual difference man never understands the loss of flesh because he only sacrifices the female flesh.

#### We cannot make sense of human subjectivity absent realization of sexuate difference, aff advantages are incoherent calls to maintain a detrimental ontological relationship making the critique a logical prior question

**Jones 11** (Emma, a dissertation, Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy “SPEAKING AT THE LIMIT: THE ONTOLOGY OF LUCE IRIGARAY’S ETHICS, IN DIALOGUE WITH LACAN AND HEIDEGGER” https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/11542/Jones\_Emma\_Reed\_phd2011sp.pdf, Donnie)

I utilize the term “ethics” in several senses. On the one hand, I believe that Irigaray’s reformulation of subjectivity by way of relational ontology is “ethical” in the Aristotelian sense that Irigaray thinks the human being as one who must enact itself to the fullest of its potential, and in the most “excellent” or virtuous way. xvii The event of being as relation, of which I spoke earlier, does not simply announce what “is,” but rather calls upon the human subject to respond in and to this relation (as I elaborate in Chapters IV and V). Thus, on the other hand, this vision is also “ethical” in the sense that to become actualized as a subject is to recognize oneself as always already related to another, di erent subject—the sexuate other. As, I argue, Irigaray’s most recent works (in particular Sharing the World) explicitly show, this self-actualization of humanity is shared between two subjects who are mutually and continually formed and re-formed as a result of this process. Therefore **if the relation between the two is askew**—*if it is violent*, *dehumanizing, or* otherwise *detrimental*—**our very understanding of human subjectivity** **and all that goes with it is harmed.** This shared self-actualization process is the essence of the concept “relational limitation.” I illustrate this in Chapter V of the dissertation through my exploration of the figure of “place” in Irigaray’s writing. I speak there of place as a dialogical figure that encapsulates Irigaray’s ethical transformation of subjectivity. What it means to be a subject for Irigaray, I argue, is to perpetually move, in language, toward the “place” of the other and back into the “place” of the self, at once motivated and restricted by the “relational limit” that both connects and separates the two. The thinking of this limit, again, encompasses Irigaray’s reformulations of ontology, language, and ethics as interrelated and as shared. With regard to Irigaray’s explicitly formulated ethics of sexuate difference, however, some commentators have worried that, in focusing on the “relation” between sexuate subjects, Irigaray’s work is only applicable to intimate or sexual relations between men and women. This is the substance of Judith Butler’s critique of Irigaray, for instance, in the Diacritics interview, where she even quips that Irigaray’s work should be filed under “heterosexual studies.” However, as I hope my discussion of ontology above has already shown, when Irigaray speaks about the “relation” of sexuate subjects, she does not only mean a specific intimate relation between men and women. Rather, the relation takes place at the ontological level, such that the event of being is already an event of relation between-two, and the “subject” also comes to be re-defined as two: internally limited-by and perpetually moved-toward the sexuate other. As Gail Schwab (2007) notes (and as I explain further in Chapter V), we can thus draw a distinction between an “empirical” relation between the sexes and an “ontological” one. Schwab quotes Irigaray in To Be Two, who writes: “Certainly, I can decide to become woman while suspending my empirical relationship with the other gender [...] but [...] to be woman necessarily involves [...] **to be in relation with man, at least ontologically**.” (TBT: 34; Schwab, 32). Schwab interprets this quote to say that “[a]lthough generically, to be woman requires a relation to the other man, just as to be a man requires a relation to the other woman, becoming a woman at the level of the individual is not dependent upon a heterosexual love choice” (32). Thus, while the ethics of relationality proposed by Irigaray would certainly be applicable to empirical heterosexual love relations, it is certainly not limited to this sphere, and instead concerns the relation between male and female genres (the French term translated as “genders”) as a whole—a relation that, in turn, affects all of our empirical relations. Thus, as I will discuss in Chapter V, the ethical practice of dialogue as the enactment of a relational limit is applicable to all human relationships. Nonetheless, for Irigaray, **it is critical to transform the ontological relation of sexuate difference** (a transformation that, I argue, must be pursued through dialogues with all sexuate others) ***first and foremost*** if these relationships are to thrive. Stating that the definitions of sexuate subjects are intimately bound up with the status of an ontological relation thus does not mean that we can only actualize as sexuate subjects through entering into specific empirical relations with members of the “other” sex. Instead, it means that there is always an underlying ontological relation between “masculine” and “feminine” subjectivity as a whole. This underlying relation may be more or less violently skewed or repressed in a variety of ways, as Irigaray’s work attempts to reveal. And while this underlying relation certainly affects empirical relations between the sexes, the two are not interchangeable. Nonetheless, it is important to note the empirical effects that the repression or skewing of this ontological relation has. Indeed, from Irigaray’s point of view, we can view the oppression of women as the failure of an ethically-enabling relationality—the ongoing erasure of their subjective place as women. As I will discuss in Chapter V, this is manifest in such global problems as domestic violence and unequal division of labor between the sexes. These examples indeed remind us of the force of Irigaray’s vision, in that men and women, on the whole, do have to “share the world” together—**regardless of their individual, empirical relationships—and manifestly must learn to do so more ethically**. xviii

#### **Sexual difference is a prior question**

Casey 97

(Damien Casey Australian Catholic University, Brisbane “Maximus and Irigaray: Metaphysics and Difference” <http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/staffhome/dacasey/Maximus&Irigaray.pdf>, Donnie)

For Irigaray, however, the meaning and significance of sexual difference is not something established in the beginning as some norm to which we should comply. Rather it shows the way forward, inviting us to become co-creators in a manner that goes beyond simply procreation, which would be simply to reduce creation to its material basis. Irigaray’s insistence upon the priority of sexual difference is, in a sense, **strategic**. How can we approach the question of the other without considering the most basic of differences by which human society is structured? 11 Sexual difference then is exemplary of all difference. But to define the other by their biological difference is both to deny the other as an independent source of self understanding and to put obstacles on the path to the spiritualisation of matter, to deny that the flesh might become word.

### A2 Permutation --- 2nc Feminism

#### ---The permutation is the link --- Their attempt to reduce all perspectives to one neatly packaged advocacy is the foundation of sexual indifference.

#### – this is a direct impact turn to their community DA – their attempt to characterize the flesh as “all the same” results in a masculine perspective – they literally said this in cross X

Xu 1995

Ping, Irigaray's Mimicry and the Problem of Essentialism, Hypatia, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 76-89

At the beginning of her essay "Sexual Difference," Irigaray writes: "Sexual difference is one of the important questions of our age, if not in fact the burning issue. According to Heidegger, each age is preoccupied with one thing, and one alone. Sexual difference is probably that issue in our own age which could be our salvation on an intellectual level" (Irigaray 1991a, 165). For Irigaray, one of the reasons why an elaboration of sexual difference becomes necessary, even urgent, is the apparent failure of traditional feminism to resist being reabsorbed into the existing male-dominated order that is actually characterized by sexual indifference. Here lies the fundamental difference between Irigaray and Simone de Beauvoir, as Irigaray clearly indicates in her essay written for the occasion of the death of de Beauvoir (Irigaray 1992, 9-14). Why is traditional feminism so readily reabsorbed into the existing male- dominated order? For Irigaray, the answer is that the goal of traditional feminism has been to demand equality to men, thereby it has been complicit with the existing male-dominated order, which is characterized by "its power to reduce all others to the economy of the Same" and "its power to eradicate the difference between the sexes in systems that are self-representative of a 'masculine subject' " (Irigaray 1985a, 74). In this sense, traditional feminism represents what Irigaray calls "a direct feminine challenge" to the existing order, which means "demanding to speak as a (masculine), 'subject', that is, it means to postulate a relation to the intelligible that would maintain sexual indifference" (Irigaray 1991a, 124).

#### ---The combination of feminism and postmodernism cripples the alternative --- Abandons the oppressed in favor of middle-class indifference.

Bondi & Dornosh 1992

L., Department of Geography, University of Edinburgh, M. Department of Geography, Florida Atlantic University, Other figures in other places: on feminism, postmodernism and geography, Environment rmd Planning D: Society and Space, volumo 10, pnqoa 199-213

Thus, the apparent symmetry of the encounter outlined by Fraser and Nicholson (1988) conceals some important asymmetries likely to render the proposed marriage of feminism to postmodernism at least as unhappy as that earlier liaison between feminism and Marxism (Hartmann, 1979). Hartsock (1987, page 196) expresses doubts shared by many feminists: "Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at this moment in history, when so many groups are engaged in 'nationalisms' which involve redefinitions of the marginalized Others, that doubt arises in the academy about the nature of the 'subject', about the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about historical 'progress'. Why is it, exactly at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes 'problematic'? Just when we are forming our own theories about the world, uncertainty emerges about whether the world can be adequately theorized? Just when we are talking about the changes we want, ideas of progress and the possibility of 'meaningfully' organizing human society become suspect? And why is it only now that critiques are made of the will to power inherent in the effort to create theory?" Hartsock does not interpret postmodernism as a conspiracy consciously designed to undercut 'marginalized Others'. Nor does she defend totalizing discourses, whether advanced by dominant or subordinate groups\* Rather she traces through the texts of white, Western, middle-class, male theorists the imprint of the structural position from which they start. Although their moves to abandon the centre for the margins and to relinquish their previously assumed authority to speak for others are to be welcomed, the marginalized and subordinated have occupied different positions and must therefore make different moves. Attempts by postmodernists to define the ground on which these others move is unacceptable and hypocritical (see also Ricci, 1987). Hartsock's suspicions stem from a consideration of the context within which postmodernism is discussed, and the effect of that context on the writing and reading of specific texts. Most importantly, she foregrounds relations of power. From this perspective the postmodernist project, conceived by a dominant, powerful group attempting to 'deal with\* threats to their legitimacy, is simply not an appropriate starting place for feminists attempting to challenge the power relations of gender from a position of subordination, and to grapple with power differences (of class, \*race\ ethnicity) among women (Ramazanoglu, 1989; Spelman, 1990). The failure of postmodernism to deal adequately with questions of power, including its own and that of its chief advocates, alerts us to serious dangers in liaisons between feminism and postmodernism. Given the peripheral position of feminism within geography, together with the continuing subordination of women within its division of labour (Lee, L990; McDowell and Pcake, 1990), caution is particularly appropriate. In particular, we must resist moves to assimilate feminist geography within postmodernism.

### A2: Perm Solve Gender Later

#### Intrinsic because it adds timeframe into the equation – justifies perm do the 1AC and solve world peace which kills competitive equity

#### And this is kind of screwed up – postponing recognition of differences within our community probably means that suffering will continue in the interim which is inherently unethical

### LINK

#### 6 LINKS

#### 1 Child birth – this is a sacrifice in and out of itself for myriad reasons – it pushes the limits of the human body for the sake of doubling the flesh of the “USFG” – their masculine subjectivity doesn’t recognize this facet of human reproduction and doesn’t think its sufficient to solve their harms which reinforces patriarchal power structures

#### 2- SACRAFICE

#### Batialle’s basis of sacrifice is predicated upon the male experience- we don’t sacrifice ourselves; we sacrifice the female body to the male experience. It’s no coincidence that

#### Their Hansen & Stepputat 05 evidence says that man is in his natural state reveling in an uninhibited sexual experience-

). Sovereignty resides in every human being and shows itself in the desire to enjoy and revel in brief moments of careless freedom, in sexual ecstasy, in moments of simple nonanticipatory existence, when an individual experiences "the miraculous sensation of having the world at his disposal" (199). This was the original condition of man in "his non-alienated condition

#### Bataille always writes of women being raped as the sacrificial man, its because his entire theory is predicated upon a finding pleasure in a male experience.

#### their 1ac Stoekl evidence says that

“the standing reserve is there, at the ready; raw materials are there to be used for ~~Man’s~~ [Humanity’s] survival and comfort.”

#### That standing reserve IS the female body. Extend Roberts-Hughes - There is a threefold sacrifice of women. Woman is sacrificed for society to exist and for transgression to occur and in the sacred realm of transgression (in which there can only be totality and no difference.

#### 3- MUSCLE POWER

#### They argue for MUSCULAR energy predicated upon a masculine experience- silencing female perspectives. not only in 1ac CX but also in their Stoekl evidence. they argue that we need

Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then — muscle power and inanimate fuel power—so too there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy. The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” No intimacy

#### This conflation of power with masculine concepts reinforces the idea of a masculine subjectivity that is hell-bent on excluding the woman from political processes

#### 4-TRANSGRESSION

#### Bataille’s gender neutral account of transgression ignores masculine bias --- Their challenge to utility gains intelligibility only though the destruction of passive feminine subjects. That’s **Surkis 1996**

#### Bataille’s theory of erotic transgression presumes a universal masculine subject

**Surkis, 1996.** (Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault**,** *Diacritics* 26.2 (1996) 18-30)

The vision of erotic transgression set forth in *Erotism* concentrates on the experience of the "discontinuous subject" in his attempt to transgress the limits of individual existence by leaping or falling into the realm of continuity or limitless being in order to access the zone of death. [2](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html" \l "FOOT2) For Bataille this experience of continuity should not be confused with absolute and final death; he stresses that "continuity is what we are after, but generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run" [18-19]. The experience of death in eroticism is, by definition, always only proximate- simultaneously rupturing and maintaining the limits of individual existence. Bataille insists: "At all costs we need to transcend [limits], but we should like to transcend them and maintain them simultaneously" [141]. The transgressive experience is thus organized and produced by the imposition of a limit always existing in relation to it, even and especially at the moment of its rupture. The sensation of transgression is conditioned by a cognizance of the taboo and is, as a result, fundamentally "duplicitous," performing "a reconciliation of what seems impossible to reconcile, respect for the law and violation of the law . . . " [36]. **[End Page 19]** Transgression thus *heightens* orcreatesanawareness of the law. As Bataille writes: "If we observe the taboo, if we submit to it, we are no longer conscious of it. But in the act of violating it we feel the anguish of mind without which the taboo could not exist . . . That experience leads to the completed transgression which, in maintaining the prohibition, maintains it in order to benefit by it [*pour en jouir*]" [38; *OC* 42]. Since the pleasures or *jouissance* of eroticism are intimately related to the injunctions that prohibit them, the subject must always be aware of the existence of the law in order to experience limitless being in the moment of transgression; he must be sensitive "to the anguish at the heart of the taboo no less great than the desire which leads him to infringe it" [38-39]. This is the fundamental structure of Bataille's transgression, and, as Carolyn Dean has argued, this paradoxical dynamic is integral to his understanding of the subject. Because his self-loss actually makes him aware of the law, it is "lived as the constituent moment of self-hood" [242; see also Hollier]. However, Dean questions the universal applicability of a subjectivity founded by its own dissolution. She argues that it presumes a "masculine" subject who initially possesses a position or self to transgress or lose. Dean suggests that, for Bataille, the reconciliation of "manhood" and castration are constitutive of his notion of the "virile" rather than incompatible with it. In effect, the "wholeness" of Bataille's virile man is, as she writes, "paradoxically linked to an experience of transgressing limits rather than of containment within boundaries that would demarcate his being." If this virility is repeatedly produced in and by self-dissolution of a masculine subject, Dean wonders where "women figure in this scheme of things**"** [244-45]. [3](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html#FOOT3) Upon reading *Erotism*, we find that images of women's self-loss are prominent in Bataille's theory of erotic transgression; they are instrumental to the enactment of masculine self-loss.

#### 5-LOSS

#### Bataille’s account of loss relies on essentialized gender divisions that collapse the political space necessary for true femininity.

Surkis 1996

Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault, *Diacritics*m Vol 26, No 2, Georges Bataille: an occasion for Misunderstanding, pg 18-30

Bataille's introductory discussion of the process by which individual discontinuity is ruptured-the mise en oeuvre of eroticism-relies on an initial, gendered difference between erotic partners. Bataille writes: The transition from the normal state to that of erotic desire presupposes a partial dissolution of the person as he exists in the realm of discontinuity .... In the process of dissolution, the masculine partner [partenaire masculin] has generally an active role, while the feminine part [partie f6minine] is passive. The passive, female side is essentially the one that is dissolved as a separate entity [en tant qu'etre continue]. But for the male partner the dissolution of the passive partner means one thing only: it is paving the way for a fusion where both are mingled, attaining at length the same degree of dissolution. [17; OC 23] A fundamental division is enacted here between the "masculine partner" and the "feminine part"; the feminine side is already lost as a subject, a partial object from the beginning. In order for the masculine side to lose himself, the passive, feminine side must be always already dissolved as a continuous being: her loss initiates his fall into continuity. In the meantime, the masculine partner is only "relatively dissolved," remaining "discontinuous" enough to derive meaning and sense from her imaged annihilation. The feminine dissolution is thus necessarily prior to the masculine, with his experience of continuity predicated on her prior and total self-loss. Bataille elaborates on what is "seen" by the masculine partner in this scenario, outlining how an "aura of death" is necessary in order to "denote" erotic passion. To whom is this passion denoted? The beloved is repeatedly inscribed as significant for the lover; the scenario functions within a specular economy in which her image of dissolution appears as a meaningful sign for him. Bataille writes: "Only in the violation, through death if need be, of the individual's solitariness can there appear that image of the beloved object which has for the lover the sense of all that is [qu'apparait cette image de l'e'tre aime qui a pour l'amant le sens de tout ce qui est]" [20-21; OC 26]. This image of the beloved is, paradoxically, transparent, a window onto a world of limitless being: "The beloved is for the lover the transparency of the world. Through the beloved appears... full and limitless being, which does not limit, which no longer limits personal discontinuity [l'etre plein et illimite, que ne limite, que ne limite plus la discontinuite personelle]" [21; OC 26]. Full and limitless being "appears" to the lover through the beloved's transparency-her present absence. This being is "glimpsed as a deliverance through the person of the perceived being [l'etre aperCue]" [21; OC 26]. Continuous being arises as a possibility only when seen through the transparency of the beloved; she renders limitlessness to the lover. This limitlessness is then always perceived by the lover; he remains "discontinuous" and distanced enough to sense her loss. It is unclear what the beloved ever "sees." Or rather, the point is precisely that the beloved sees nothing.

### 2NC A2: Bataille Hates Shit/Read it differently whatever

#### This is an interpretation of Bataille that should be rejected – you can’t determine Bataille’s intent through a sole external interpretation by another scholar, we should look to the words used in the advocacy of political strategy because that’s what shapes our decisionmaking process

#### And even if Bataille is against imperialism, the political strategy fails because it misunderstands the idea that community itself is impossible when the female question is left up in the air – Batailles ignorance of this in the idea of sacrifice means that reading it through a different lens doesn’t account for its transformative potential at the hands of a masculine society

### 2NC A2: 1AC Solves

#### If we win a link – you don’t solve, community focus sucks that was above

### A2 Alt Fails --- 2nc Feminism

#### ---The alternative is to view the debate space as a place to separate from patriarchal culture and practice feminine difference. Only this move can change thinking & facilitate the development of effective political strategies.

Bell 1993

Linda A., Professor of philosophy @ Georgia State University, Rethinking Ethics in the Midst of Violence: a Feminist Approach to Freedom, pg 63-64

Tactical separatism affirms separation as a limited strategy, as a temporary expedient, necessary if certain ends are to be achieved. Such separatism is regarded as absolutely unavoidable by most feminist theorists. Representative of these is Luce Irigaray when she states, For women to undertake tactical strikes, to keep themselves apart from men long enough to learn to defend their desire, especially through speech, to discover the love of other women while sheltered from men's imperious choices that put them in the position of rival commodities, to forge for themselves a social status that compels recognition, to earn their living in order to escape from the condition of prostitute...these are certainly indispensable stages in the escape from their proletarization on the exchange market. 29 Even more basically, as Marilyn Frye argues, the creation of separate spaces “somewhat sheltered from the prevailing winds of patriarchal culture” is necessary for an individual's sense of body and self: “[O]ne needs space to *practice* an erect posture; one cannot just will it to happen. To retrain one's body one needs physical freedom from what are, in the last analysis, physical forces misshaping it to the contours of the subordinate. Se

paration is necessary, too, “to avoid being demoralized.” As Sarah Hoagland says, at least separation dispels “the illusion that we are equal participants in these events, [thus] we can avoid claiming responsibility for something over which we have no control.” This seems particularly important to recognize in a society that has developed into a fine art the technique of distorting power relations by blaming the victim, the one who is relatively powerless. Separation may be necessary if one is to understand what is going on, since it offers “a way of pulling back from the existing conceptual framework, noting its patterns, and understanding their function regardless of the mythology espoused within the framework.” Perhaps, too, only with some pulling away from the systems of oppression surrounding us can we begin to free our thinking and our imaginations to devise practical strategies and alternatives.

### create community

#### the way you become a community and lose yourself keeps the male experience, while totally getting rid of the female

**Surkis, 1996.** (Judith, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and Foucault**,** *Diacritics* 26.2 (1996) 18-30)

An analysis of the gendered positions inscribed in Bataille's theory of transgression calls into question the possibility and even viability of the total self-loss that is upheld as its goal. [11](http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.stcloudstate.edu/journals/diacritics/v026/26.2surkis.html" \l "FOOT11) This, it appears to me, is exactly why Foucault consistently effaces the role of gendered partners in eroticism. An account of the gendering of Bataille's transgression demonstrates how it remains within a specular and speculative economy in which the writing subject is always at a certain distance from what he "sees." While he might desire to totally lose himself in the loss of another, the writing subject always remains conscious enough of that loss to theorize. Bataille's transgression may thus be read against itself in [End Page 29] order to demonstrate that the "masculine" writing subject always maintains his position vis-à-vis a witnessed "feminine" loss, which explains why Foucault shies away from the consideration of gender. We therefore need to examine how transgression underwrites the theoretical/philosophical subject in the process of purportedly undermining it and hence to account for the writing subject's position rather than deny its continued existence. An interrogation of the gendering operative in transgression then raises a number of further questions concerning the radicality of gestures toward self-loss (a series of questions that, in his attempt to proclaim the disruptiveness of transgression, Foucault cannot afford to address). Does this desire for self-dissolution, which is founded on the "image" of another's loss, in fact strengthen or reinscribe the position of the "masculine" witness rather than radically disable it? An examination of the gendered dynamic of transgression raises the problem of *who* is really lost. Who benefits from the enactment of self-loss? Who witnesses and theorizes about the simultaneous appearance of the limit and its transgression? Who loses an eye?